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INTRODUCTION
During the twentieth century, America has developed a childhood
immunization program that many praise as the most spectacular
public health success in history.' Over a period of fifty years, the
United States has dramatically reduced the annual occurrence of
polio, whooping cough, and measles.2 Diseases that once threatened
to end prematurely the life of every American infant are now
prevented with a routine series of early childhood vaccinations.3
With such a record of success, it is perhaps surprising to discover
that American vaccine policy remains in a state of flux. At the heart
of the controversy lies a legal debate that extends beyond the
1. See H.R. REP. NO. 908,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 HOUsE REPORT]
(stating that childhood vaccination has saved thousands of lives and billions of health care
dollars), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. 6344, 6345.
2. Randall B. Keiser, Dea Vu All Over Again? The National Childhood Vaccine Injuqi
Compensation Act of 1986,47 FOOD DRUG COSM. LJ. 25, 25 (1982) (citing reduction ofAmerican
polio incidence from 57,000 cases in 1952 to 4 in 1984, whooping cough incidence from 265,000
cases in 1934 to 2000 in 1982, and measles incidence from 2250 deaths In 1941 to 2 deaths In
1983).
3. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CA.N. at 6345
(stating that vaccines have prevented thousands of deaths every year).
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relatively narrow field of childhood immunization. This debate
focuses on the recurring product liability dilemma of how to properly
establish a balance between product safety and product availability.
Due to the social costs at stake, the debate over this issue is particular-
ly intense in the context of children's vaccines. On the one hand,
vaccine manufacturers insist that increased regulation and liability ill
make vaccine producers uninsurable and stymie research and
development.4 Given the indisputable social utility of children's
vaccines, this argument carries significant merit. On the other hand,
plaintiffs' coalitions and certain scientists insist that vaccine manufac-
turers currently market unsafe vaccines to American children As
evidence, these groups cite the recurring incidence of brain damage
and even death in young vaccine recipients.6
Recent legislative and executive proposals have once again brought
the vaccine debate to the political forefront. In 1993, the Clinton
administration introduced and successfully passed a bill providing free
vaccines to eligible children.7 Commenting on the legislation,
President Clinton stated, "Our nation is the only industrialized nation
in the world that does not guarantee childhood vaccination for all
children. It ought to be like clean water and clean air. It ought to
be part of the fabric of our life."8
Shortly after passing this initiative, Republican candidates for the
House of Representatives published the "Contract with America."9
Item nine of the Contract advocates the curtailment of state strict
liability laws and the passage of uniform federal product liability
legislation?'
4. National Childhood Vaccine-Injny Gmpensation Ad of 1985: Hearing on S. 827 Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resourca 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 240 (1985) (statement of
Robert Johnson, President, Lederle Lab.) (stating that number of carriers i illing to insure
Lederle in 1985 dropped from 26 to 8).
5. See id at 42 (statement ofJeffrey H. Schwartz, President, Dissatisfied Parents Together)
(announcing Dissatisfied Parents Together's goal of enacting more stringent testing procedures
for children's vaccines).
6. See Vaccine Injwy Compensation: Hearings on H.. 5810 Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1934)
[hereinafter 1984 Vaccine Hearing] (statement of Dr. Edsard Brandt, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
Health) (explaining that risk of permanent neurologic damage from DTP vaccine is one in
310,000).
7. See42 U.S.C. § 1396s(a)(1) (A) (Supp.V 1993) (providingNaccinations at no charge for
statutorily eligible children).
8. Paul Richter, Child Vacnain Program Is Pushd Halth, LA. TUMS, Feb. 13,1993, atA
(internal quotation marks omitted).
9. SezTony Mauro, Contract with Ama"ic The Common Senselegal Rfom A4 USA TODAY,
Nov. 17, 1994, at A10 (stating that more than 300 Republican congressional candidates signed
Contract with America on September 27, 1994).
10. See The Republican 'Contract with Ameira, 'PHuA. INQUIRER, Dec. 18, 1994, at C8.
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Although neither of these proposals directly affects vaccine-related
injury litigation, both demonstrate the continuing difficulties our
nation faces in its attempt to establish a workable balance between
product availability and product safety. In the interest of increasing
dialogue on this crucial issue, this Comment reexamines a recent
legislative attempt to reform vaccine product liability litigation, the
National Childhood Injury Compensation Act of 1986 (Vaccine
Act)." This important legislation removed the common law element
of negligence from vaccine product liability litigation by creating a
no-fault compensation program funded by an excise tax on vac-
cines. 2 The Vaccine Act requires plaintiffs to file a claim against the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (the
Secretary) rather than against the vaccine manufacturer.'3 A valid
claim includes an affidavit and documentation proving that the
injuries received were caused by a vaccine.'4 If the petitioner is
dissatisfied with the result of the no-fault litigation, she may reject the
judgment and pursue a civil tort action against the vaccine manufac-
turer.5
Although the Vaccine Act permits vaccine-injury victims to sue
manufacturers under state product liability laws, Congress limits the
legal theories available to those who forego the Vaccine Act's
compensation system. 6 The Vaccine Act affords protection consis-
tent with Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A comment k'7
(comment k) to vaccines covered by the Act, thereby shielding
manufacturers from strict design defect liability.'8 The Vaccine Act
also adopts the learned intermediary doctrine, allowing manufacturers
11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to-34 (1988 & Supp.V 1993).
12. Id. § 300aa-15 (i) (2) (1988) (providing for payments for vaccine-related injury or death
through Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund); see also 26 U.S.C. § 9510(a) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (mandating that revenues from taxes on vaccines provide monies for fund).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. L § 300aa-11(c).
15. d. § 300aa-21 (a) (1)-(2) (1988) (requiring that petitioner must file with Court of
Federal Claims decision whether to accept compensation or pursue civil action within 90 days
of court's finaljudgment). The Court of Federal Claims hasjurisdiction over claims concerning
compensation under the Vaccine Act. Id. § 300aa-12(a) (Supp. V 1993).
16. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on causes of action
available under Vaccine Act).
17. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) (explaining that
manufacturers of items that are unavoidably unsafe, such as prescription drugs, shall not be held
strictly liable for injuries relating to their product, as long as product is manufactured properly
and contains adequate warnings). The justification for the absence of strict liability lies in the
fact that while these products can never become totally safe, they constitute a desirable and
helpful product, furthering the health and well-being of society. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b) (1) (1988) (stating that manufacturer of vaccine shall not be
liable for any vaccine-related injury or death caused by unavoidable side effects so long as
manufacturer properly prepared and labeled vaccine with proper warnings).
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to fulfill their duty to warn by transmitting information to the treating
physician rather than to the vaccinee directly. 9 Finally, the Vaccine
Act creates a presumption that manufacturer vrarnings that comply
with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standards are
adequate, thereby preventing state courts from performing an
independent assessment of these warnings' sufficiency.
2
The Vaccine Act is important legislation because it represents an
effort by both vaccine consumers and vaccine manufacturers to strike
a middle ground between the seemingly incongruous goals of vaccine
safety and vaccine availability. Instead of focusing on the statutory no-
fault compensation program of the Vaccine Act, this Comment
examines the role that the civil tort system plays in balancing product
safety and product availability. As a device for framing this often
amorphous topic, this Comment reviews and comments on the
Vaccine Act's three fundamental alterations to state tort law for those
plaintiffs, who, after rejecting the results of the statutory no-fault
compensation program, proceed with a civil law suit against a vaccine
manufacturer. Admittedly, the Vaccine Act's alterations of state tort
law will not have a large impact on vaccine litigation because most
vaccine injury claims are resolved within the statutory framework.
The hope is, however, that an examination of the alterations to the
civil tort system, codified by Congress in the Vaccine Act, will provide
guidance for future legislative reforms in the area of product liability.
Part I explores the vaccine crisis that inspired Congress to reform
vaccine litigation. Part II describes the Vaccine Act. Part IIl considers
the Vaccine Act's adoption of the learned intermediary doctrine. Part
IV analyzes the Vaccine Act's presumption that warnings complying
with FDA standards are adequate and confronts the larger question
of the proper relationship between federal regulations and state
common law. Part V discusses the Vaccine Act's blanket application
of comment k to all vaccines.
Following the evaluation of Congress' alteration of state tort law,
Part VI offers a series of conclusions and recommendations for future
legislative action. First, the Vaccine Act's elimination of a plaintiff's
cause of action under a failure-to-warn tort theory represents a
prudent compromise between the dual interests of reducing manufac-
turer liability and maintaining vaccine safety. Second, the presump-
tion of warning adequacy in the Vaccine Act allows manufacturers to
19. Id. § 300aa-22(c) (providing that no manufacturer shall be liable in civil actions for
failing to directly warn injured recipient).
20. Id. § 300aa-22(b)(2). But sm. id. § 300aa-23(d)(2) (alloing plaintiff to rebut
presumption by showing that manufacturer engaged in fraud or failed to exercise due care).
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disregard knowledge of vaccine inadequacies so long as the vaccine
warning complies with FDA standards. To remedy this deficiency,
Congress should require manufacturers with knowledge of warning
deficiencies to seek FDA permission to modify their warnings even
though existing warnings meet FDA standards. Third, Congress'
blanket application of comment k immunity to all vaccines ignores
research indicating that manufacturers may currently possess the
scientific knowledge to produce safer, alternative vaccines. Congress
therefore should amend the Vaccine Act by incorporating a
risk-benefit analysis prior to awarding "unavoidably unsafe" status to
a vaccine.
I. THE VACCINE CRISIS
In response to fears that the civil tort system had destabilized the
vaccine market, Congress reexamined vaccine liability issues in the
early 1980s.1 In addition to concerns about the availability of
vaccines, Congress received pressure from pro-plaintiff groups
complaining about the civil tort system's inequities.22 These dual
concerns led Congress to the conclusion that American vaccine policy
was in a state of crisis and required a systemic overhaul. 5
A. Instability of the Vaccine Market
Several related incidents brought to light the instability of the
American vaccine market. Fearful that the $3.5 billion in damages
sought by vaccine injury victims between 1980 and 1984 presaged
major financial exposure,24 six manufacturers ceased production of
vaccines.' Whereas at one time eight private pharmaceutical
companies produced the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP) vaccine,
only two, Lederle and Connaught, continued to manufacture the DTP
vaccine in 1986.26 Similarly, by 1986, Lederle and Connaught were
21. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, repinted in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. at 6348
(stating that concerns of vaccine market instability led to creation of Vaccine Act); SUBCOMM.
ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH
CONG., 2D SESS., CHILDHOOD IMMUNIzATIONS 72 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter CHILDHOOD
IMMUNIZATIONS] (stating that manufacturers began fleeing from vaccine market in 1966).
22. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348
(discussing dissatisfaction with current compensation system); 1984 Vaccine Heaing, supra note
6, at 111 (statement of Donna Gray, Dissatisfied Parents Together) (asking Congress for
compensation program).
23. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, rerinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6348.
24. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 21, at 86 (presenting results of vaccine
manufacturer survey).
25. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 21, at 68.
26. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 21, at 68.
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the only manufacturers of polio vaccines.' The majority of vaccine
manufacturers left the market citing the unavailability of product
liability insurance.2'
The decrease in the number of vaccine manufacturers resulted in
a concomitant decline in the national vaccine stockpile.' In 1986,
the vaccine stockpile had fallen below the Center for Disease
Control's recommended six-month reserve supply.' Those manufac-
turers remaining in the vaccine market greatly increased their
prices."1 For example, a dose of the measles, mumps, and rubella
(MMR) vaccine increased in cost from $2.71 in 1980 to $8.47 in
1986.2 Congress therefore feared an actual vaccine shortage and
the possible reemergence of formerly contained deadly diseases.'
B. The Inability of the Civil Tort System to Prvide Adequate
Compensation for Vaccine-Related Injuries
In addition to concerns regarding the effects of liability on the
vaccine market, Congress also voiced doubts about the sufficiency of
the civil tort system as a compensation mechanism.' Certain
components of state tort law present substantial barriers to compensa-
tion for victims of vaccine-related injuries. For example, many courts
have bestowed "unavoidably unsafe" status upon vaccines, thereby
foreclosing strict liability design defect claims.' Furthermore, the
fact that vaccination is often made compulsory by law, makes it
27. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, mtu~p note 21, at 67.
28. See 1984 Vaccine Heaing, supra note 6, at 266 (statement of Dr.james Afason. Director.
Center for Disease Control) (explaining that Connaught's inability to obtain insurance was
reason for its withdrawal from market).
29. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 21, at 70-71.
30. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 21, at 71 (reporting that as of 1986, Center
for Disease Control had four-month stockpile of oral polio vaccine and was attempting to
establish 10-week stockpile of DTP vaccine).
31. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. at 6345
(stating that price of vaccines has increased greatly due in part to increased litigation
surrounding vaccine-related injuries or deaths).
32. CHILDHOOD IMmNATIONS, supra note 21, at 63.
33. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, rprinkcd in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348
(discussing fear that withdrawal of one vaccine manufacturer could trigger outbreak of
preventable disease).
34. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6, r/rinti in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6347
(noting that very few individuals injured by vaccines ever receive compensation, and stating that
"[blut for the relatively few who are injured by vaccine-through no fault of their own-the
opportunities for redress and restitution are limited, time consuming, ex-pensive, and often
unanswered").
35. See, eg., Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1230-31 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding
comment k applicable to drugs and medical devices); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470,
477 (Cal. 1988) (holding that comment kapplies to all prescription dnigs);Johnson v.American
Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318,1323 (Kan. 1986) (holding that sabin polio vaccine is unavoidably
unsafe as matter of law).
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extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove proximate cause.86
Specifically, manufacturers argue that better warnings about a
vaccine's potential dangers would not persuade potential plaintiffs to
forego receiving a vaccine because all children must receive vaccina-
tions before beginning school and all children must attend school."7
Vaccine-injury litigation is also extremely lengthy. Given the
fact-intensive discovery needed to establish manufacturer liability, a
victim of a vaccine-related injury must often wait years from the date
of injury to receive compensationm
II. THE VACCINE AcT
The Vaccine Act created a no-fault compensation system for victims
of certain vaccine-related injuries. 9 For injuries occurring after
passage of the Act, all petitioners alleging injury are required to
participate in the Act's adjudication process.40 If petitioners are not
satisfied with the outcome of the statutory no-fault adjudication
process, they may pursue traditional tort actions.41
The Vaccine Act restructures many aspects of civil torts litigation.42
The Secretary, rather than the vaccine manufacturer, serves as the
defendant.43 The Office of Special Masters of the United States
Court of Federal Claims acts as the trier of law and fact." Rules of
36. See PeggyJ. Naile, Tort Liability for DTP Vaccine Injury and the Preemption Doctrine, 22 IND.
L. REV. 655, 682 (1989) (stating that state-mandated vaccination removes choice element); Fay
F. Spence, Alternatives to Manufacturers Liability for Injuries Caused By the Sabin-Type Oral Polio
Vaccines, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 711, 734 (1986) (arguing that inadequate warning cannot
constitute proximate cause of vaccine injury).
37. SeeSpence, supra note 36, at 732 (arguing that mandatory vaccination makes adequacy
of warning irrelevant).
38. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6, rprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6347
(stating that lawsuits can take years to complete); CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 21,
at 87 (reporting results of manufacturer survey showing that of 299 claims filed betvcen 1980
and 1985, 72% were still pending in 1985).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a) (1) (A)-(B) (1988) (,directing that petitioner shall receive
compensation if petitioner proves causation and Secretary of Health and Human Services falls
to prove that unrelated factors caused injury); see also 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6344 (referring to Vaccine Act as "no-fault" compensation
system).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11 (a) (2) (A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (explaining that petitioners
may not bring civil action in state or federal court if seeking more than $1000 in damages unless
petitioner has filed petition pursuant to Vaccine Act).
41. See id. § 300aa-21(a)(1)-(2) (1988) (stating that following enty ofjudgment, petitioner
shall file election within 90 days either accepting or rejectingjudgment).
42. Cr. CL. It App. J., Rule 7 ("There shall be no discovery as a matter of right. The
informal and cooperative exchange of information is the ordinary and preferred practice."),
43. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
44. See id. § 300aa-12(d) (3) (A) (Supp. V 1993) (instructing special master to issue decision
as to whether petitioner is entitled to compensation).
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procedure under the Vaccine Act are less formal than traditional
rules. 45
Petitioners in the no-fault compensation system may prove
entitlement to compensation in two different vrays. The Vaccine Act
contains a Vaccine Injury Table listing certain injuries, symptoms of
such injuries, and time limits for the onset of such injuries.4 A
petitioner able to demonstrate both that she suffered an injury listed
in the vaccine table and that the first manifestation of the injury
occurred within the time limit prescribed by the table creates a
presumption of causation.47 A petitioner who is unable to prove the
existence of a table injury is still entitled to compensation if she can
prove causation-in-fact.' Petitioners may satisfy the burden of proof
by demonstrating causation-in-fact by a preponderance of the
evidence.49 Once a petitioner has established either a table injury
or causation-in-fact by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden
shifts to the respondent to prove that a factor unrelated to the
administration of the vaccine caused the injury. °
As previously noted, after adjudication of their claims under the
Vaccine Act's no-fault compensation system, petitioners may elect to
reject the finding of the special master or judge and proceed to file
a tort action in state or federal court.51 The Vaccine Act does,
however, place certain limitations on such civil causes of action.
52
The Act states that vaccine manufacturers are not liable for unavoid-
able side effects caused by vaccines that are properly prepared and
accompanied by adequate warnings. 53  The Act also directs that
manufacturer compliance with FDA warning standards creates a
45. &Se ia § 300aa-12(d) (2) (A)-(E) (recommending that Court of Federal Claims provide
for less rigid rules). The Vaccine Act specifically directs the Court of Federal Claims to
promulgate rules that "provide for a less-adversarial, expeditious, and informal proceeding for
the resolution of petitions." Id. § 300aa-12(d) (2) (A).
46. See id. § 300aa-14 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing table of presumed causation for
DTP, polio, and MMIR vaccines).
47. Id § 300aa-13(a)(1) (A) (1988).
48. Id. § 300aa-l(c)(1)(C)(ii)(I).
49. Id. § 300aa-13(a) (1) (A); seaMcClendon v. Secretary ofDep't of Health & Human Serms.,
23 Cl. Ct. 191, 195-96 (1991) (holding that burden of proof required is preponderance of
evidence rather than scientific certainty).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(B). The Code states that illnesses or injuries not
previously known to have a relation to the vaccine that are nonetheless proven to arise out of
the administration of the vaccine do not fall into the category of "factors unrelated to the
administration of the vaccine." Id. § 300aa-13(a) (2) (A)-(B).
51. ,Seid. § 00aa-21(a)(1)-(2).
52. See id § 300aa-22(b)-(c) (granting comment k immunity to all vaccines, creating pre-
sumption of adequacy in all warnings that comply with FDAstandards, and banning liability for
direct failure to warn).
53. See &L § 300aa-22(b)(1).
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presumption of adequate warnings.' Petitioners may rebut this
presumption by demonstrating with clear and convincing evidence
that the manufacturer did not exercise due care or that the manufac-
turer engaged in fraud or intentional withholding of information."
Additionally, the Act prohibits claims based on the direct failure to
warn, when failure to provide a direct warning constitutes the sole
claim. 6 Finally, although the Vaccine Act places limitations on
certain tort claims, it expressly prohibits States from banning civil
actions not proscribed by the Act itself.57
The Vaccine Act also creates certain information distribution and
recording requirements for health care providers and vaccine
manufacturers. 8 Pursuant to the Act, health care providers must
report to the Secretary all injuries that are listed in the Vaccine Injury
Table and occur within seven days of vaccine administration. 9
Health care providers must also inform the Secretary of all incidents
of contraindicating reactions listed in the manufacturer's vaccine
package insert.'"
The Vaccine Act also instructs the Secretary to develop and
distribute vaccine information materials to health care providers. 1
The vaccine information materials must include explanations of: (1)
the vaccine's benefits; (2) the vaccine's risks; (3) the existence of the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; and (4) other
relevant information.62 The Act then requires all health care
providers administering vaccines to distribute the information to the
legal representative of a child receiving the vaccine. 63
Manufacturers must keep detailed records of their manufacturing
process.' 4 The Vaccine Act mandates recording the "manufacturing,
process, testing, repooling, and reworking of each batch, lot, or other
quantity of such vaccine including any significant problems encoun-
54. See iU. § 300aa-22(b)(2) (declaring that compliance with requirement of Federal Food,
Drug, and CosmeticAct, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988 &Supp.V 1993), and Public Health Service
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1988), creates presumption of adequate varning).
55. See id. §§ 300aa-22(b)(2)(A),-23(d)(2)(A)-(G).
56. See id. § 300aa-22(c).
57. See id. § 300aa-22(e).
58. See iU. §§ 00aa-25 to -28 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring physicians to record
information related to administration of vaccine; requiring Secretary to write vaccine
information materials for distribution by physicians; and requiring manufacturers to keep
detailed records of manufacturing process).
59. See id. § 300aa-25(b) (1) (A)-(C) (1988).
60. Id.
61. See i. § 300aa-26(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (giving Secretary one year from
promulgation of Act to develop and distribute materials).
62. Id. § 300aa-26(c) (Supp. V 1993).
63. See id. § 300aa-26(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
64. See id. § 300aa-28(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
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tered in the production, testing, or handling of such batch, lot, or
other quantity" 6  Upon discovery of a potential safety hazard
involving a vaccine, a manufacturer must report the findings to the
Secretary within twenty-four hours.' The Vaccine Act imposes both
civil and criminal penalties on manufacturers for destroying, altering,
falsifying, or concealing required records.'
III. VACCINE Acr's BAN ON DIREC FAILuRE TO WARN CLAIMS
As discussed in the preceding section, the Vaccine Act prohibits
claims against manufacturers for failing to provide an adequate
warning to the ultimate recipient of the vaccine.' This legislative
decision directly conflicts with judicial decisions that required direct
warnings at mass vaccine clinics where the vaccine is not administered
by a private physician.6 9 Thus, the legislation raises questions as to
whether the Vaccine Act has sacrificed too many patient safety
mechanisms." After reviewing the learned intermediary doctrine
and its exceptions, and the Vaccine Act's informational and reporting
requirements, this Comment concludes that the Vaccine Act's
informational and reporting requirements partially compensate for
65. Id. § 300aa-28(a)(1).
66. See id § 300aa-28(a)(2) (requiring report of any suspicious test results that might
indicate potential safety hazard).
67. See id § 300aa-28(b) (1)-(2) (stating that manufacturer would be subject to civil penalty
of $100,000, criminal fine of $50,000, or one year imprisonment).
68. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (stating that vaccine manufacturer shall not
be liable for claims arising solely out of manufacturer's lack of direct %rning to injured vaccine
recipient).
69. Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977). The court in Ghivns held that
the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply when a private ph)sician administered a vaccine
in a private setting because the setting resembled a clinic situation similar to that in Rteys Sz
also Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th Cir.) (following "mass vaccine" clinic
exception to learned intermediary doctrine enunciated in Davis), ctrt. denI, 419 US. 1096
(1974); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121.131 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that manufacturer must
provide direct warning where vaccine is administered at mass clinic). But s Walker v. Merck
& Co., 648 F. Supp. 931,934 (MLD. Ga. 1986), afd 831 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1987) (limiting
Fifth and Ninth Circuits' mass vaccine exceptions to polio cases);Johnson v. American C)unamid
Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324 (Kan. 1986) (applying learned intermediary doctrine solely because
physician administered vaccine). Some commentators have argued that, given the courts'
narrow reading of Davis and its progeny, the Vaccine Act's elimination of direct warning duty
does not significantly alter products liability landscape. See Okianer C. Dark, Is the ANational
Childhood Vaccne Infiny Act of 1986 the Solution for the DTP Controvery?, 19 U. TOL L. REv. 799,
857 (1988) (arguing that plaintiffs may still have cause of action against manufacturer through
such claims as negligent preparation, improper design, or failure to warni physician understrict
liability standard).
70. See Susan A. Casey, La)ing an Old Doctrine to Rest: Challenging the lisdom of the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine 19 WM,. MITCHELL L REv. 931, 957 (1993) (asserting that learned
intermediary doctrine overestimates physicians' willingness to serve as conduit betw'een
manufacturers and patients); Alan K. Styles, Presption Drugs and theDuty to War= An Argwrunf
for Patient Package Insers, 39 CLEV. Sr. L REV. 111, 123 (1991) (arguing that under learned
intermediary doctrine, doctors are not alm)s willing to perform individualized risk assesments).
1864 THE AMERICAN UNwERsITY LAw REVIEW [Vol. 44:1853
many of the advantages lost by barring direct warning claims, namely
informed consent and patient safety." Given that Congress passed
the Vaccine Act in response to concerns about vaccine availability and
safety, 2 the decision to abolish direct warnings was a prudent
compromise." As the term "compromise" suggests, however, the
Vaccine Act is not the ultimate protector of vaccinee safety, and
future amendments should respond to this problem.7 4
A. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine
The Act's rejection of manufacturer liability for failure to provide
a direct warning to the ultimate consumer amounts to a statutory
adoption of the "learned intermediary doctrine."' First coined in
1967,76 the learned intermediary doctrine holds that, in the case of
prescription pharmaceuticals, manufacturers satisfy their duty to warn
by providing an adequate warning to the treating physician." The
learned intermediary doctrine, therefore, serves as an important
71. See infranotes 152-57 and accompanying text (arguing that informational and reporting
requirements both permit vaccinee to actively participate in risk-benefit analysis and reduce
physician discretion in decision to utilize vaccine).
72. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. at 6345
(stating that concerns propelling legislation are inadequacy of civil tort system as compensation
mechanism and instability of vaccine market).
73. See infra notes 334-35 and accompanying text (asserting that Act seeks to insulate
manufacturer from liability as well as establish pro-plaintiff compensation system).
74. See infra notes 331-32 and accompanying text (proposing combining federal reporting
regulations with state common law-based direct warning rule).
75. See Dark, supra note 69, at 848-49 (stating that Vaccine Act removes mass vaccine
exception to learned intermediary doctrine); Theodore H. Davis & Catherine B. Bowman,
No-Fault Compensation for Unavoidable Injuries: Evaluating the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 277, 304 (1991) (arguing that Act abrogates direct
warning causes of action previously permitted under Davis and its progeny); Mary Beth Neraas,
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 VASl.
L. REV. 149, 158 (1988) (stating that Act removes manufacturers' duty to warn ultimate users
directly).
76. See Sterling Drug v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (labelling consumer's
doctor as "learned intermediary" between manufacturer and consumer).
77. See Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.) (stating that manufacturers of
prescription drugs must only warn prescribing physicians), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974);
Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968) (describing customary rule that
manufacturer has duty only to warn physician prescribing drug); Dunkin v. Syntex Lab., 443 F,
Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) (stating that Tennessee law only requires prescription drug
manufacturer to warn prescribing physician adequately); Buckner v. Allergan Pharmaceuticals,
400 So. 2d 820, 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that manufacturer's duty to warn of
drug's potential dangers is fulfilled by adequate warning to prescribing doctor); Seley v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 839 (Ohio 1981) (arguing that position of physician as learned
intermediary removes manufacturers' duty to warn ultimate consumers of prescription drugs
directly).
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exception to the common law rule that manufacturers must adequate-
ly warn the ultimate recipients of their products.78
Several policy considerations justify Congress' decision to insulate
vaccine manufacturers from direct failure-to-warn liability." First,
the prescribing physician is in the best position to make an informed
decision about the relative benefits and risks of using the drug.p
The physician possesses knowledge of both the drug in question and
the patient's medical history." The physician can, taldng into
account the specific nature of the patient's medical history, perform
an individualized balancing of the vaccine's benefits and the dangers
of its use.s'
Second, patients are not likely to possess the medical knowledge
necessary to understand manufacturers' warnings. a Consumers with
inadequate medical knowledge may ignore or misinterpret important
warnings.a Third, direct warnings to consumers often take the form
78. See REsTATfENr (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 17, § 388 (requiring manufacturers
of potentially dangerous products to warn foreseeable ultimate users).
79. See Spence, supra note 36, at 728 (identilying manufacturers' dificulty in providing
direct warnings to users and insufficient patient knowledge as policy considerations supporting
learned intermediary doctrine). CircuitJudge Wisdom, in Reyes v. li~eth LaNtaori pro"ided
a persuasive justification for the learned intermediary doctrine:
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied
in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into account the
propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient. His is the task of
weighing the benefits of any medication against its potential dangers. The choice he
makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a
knowledge of both patient and palliative. Pharmaceutical companies then, who must
warn ultimate purchasers of dangers inherent in patent drugs sold over the counter,
in selling prescription drugs are required to warn only the prescribing physician. who
acts as a "learned intermediary" between the manufacturer and consumer.
Res,, 498 F.2d at 1276.
80. See Reges, 498 F.2d at 1276.
81. ML; see also Barbara Pope Flannagan, Products Lialt: The Continued iaility of the
Leartedlntemediary Rule as it A lies to Product Wandngsfor Presciption Dns 20 U. RICH. L REV.
405,413 (1986) (arguing that physician is only individual possessing knowledge of both patient
and drug).
82. Ryes, 489 F.2d at 1276; seeFlannagan, supra note 81, at 413 ("The ph)sidan's knowledge
of the patient and the drug are taken into account when the physician makes a medical
judgment as to the appropriate course of treatment for a particular patient.").
83. See Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968) (arguing that due to medical
nature of warning, it is difficult to adequately wrarn lay consumer); Flannagan, supra note 81, at
413 (arguing that direct manufacturer warnings might mislead patient).
84. SeDunkin v. Syntex Lab., 443 F. Supp. 121,123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) (stating that direct
manufacturer warningmayinterfere with doctor-patient relationship); McKee v.American Home
Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1055 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (arguing that package inserts may
confuse and flighten patients); Casey, supra note 70, at 948 (arguing that patient may fear
discussing package insert with physician and decide to avoid medical treatment); WalerJ.
Curran, Padage Inserts for Patien Informed Consent in the 9Os, 305 NEW EN.J. MED. 1564,
1566 (1981) (suggesting that package inserts may lead patients to question physician's
prescription and reject therapy altogether).
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of package inserts,'s which unlike a doctor who is available for
follow-up questions, cannot respond to all of the concerns and
questions of individual consumers.86 Fourth, prescription drug
manufacturers do not always have adequate access to their ultimate
consumers.87 Because the prescription drug is not always distributed
in its original packaging, the manufacturer may have difficulty
relaying the warning to the ultimate consumer us Finally, the
learned intermediary doctrine accepts as reality that patients normally
rely on their physicians to make medical decisions in the patient's
best interest.8 9
B. Exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
The learned intermediary doctrine is not without exceptions."
Two years after a court first coined the term "learned intermediary,"
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit announced the doctrine's
first exception in Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories.91 In Davis, the plaintiff
received a sabin oral polio vaccine at a mass immunization clinic
sponsored by Idaho public health officials and a local medical
society.92 Within thirty days of vaccination, the plaintiff developed
paralysis from the waist down.93 Although the manufacturer provid-
ed warnings to the medical society' the purchaser of the vaccines,
the plaintiff did not receive a warning.9
When considering the scope of the duty to warn, the court in Davis
began with the proposition that the learned intermediary doctrine
85. Flannagan, supra note 81, at 413 (discussing practical difficulties of direct warnings).
86. Flannagan, supra note 81, at 413 (suggesting that physician can both answer patient
questions and gauge whether patients fully understand nature of treatment).
87. Casey, supra note 70, at 948 (stating that direct contact between manufacturer and
patient is rare); Spence, supra note 36, at 728 (citing fact that patients receive prescription drugs
through physician as reason for learned intermediary doctrine).
88. Casey, supra note 70, at 948.
89. See Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Ohio 1981) ("[T~he patient Is
expected to place primary reliance upon the physician'sjudgment, and to follow his advice and
instructions as to use of the drug.").
90. See Casey, supra note 70, at 939-45 (citing mass vaccines, oral contraceptives, and
intrauterine devices as products to which learned intermediary doctrine does not apply) (citing
Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that manufacturer must provide
directwamingin mass immunization clinic context); Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 609
F. Supp. 867, 878 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (requiring oral contraceptive manufacturers to give user
direct warning)).
91. 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968).
92. See Davis, 399 F.2d at 124.
93. See id. at 122.
94. See iU at 125 (stating that warnings to medical society were in package Insert provided
in every bottle of 100 doses).
95. Seei.
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ordinarily governs failure to warn cases involving prescription
drugs.9 6 Because the decision to vaccinate is a medical determina-
tion, the manufacturer best meets its duty to warn by providing the
prescribing physician -with adequate information.' After discussing
the theoretical underpinnings of the learned intermediary doctrine,
however, the court in Davis distinguished vaccines dispensed by a
private physician from vaccines dispensed at mass clinics. When a
private physician is involved, the individualized balancing of benefits
and dangers envisioned by the authors of the learned intermediary
doctrine may be expected.93 Unlike private physicians, mass immuni-
zation clinics lack a one-on-one doctor-patient relationship, and
therefore, an individualized balancing of the benefits and risks of
vaccination is less likelyf9 The court in Davis reasoned that the
prescriptive nature of the sabin drug is a result of the vaccine's
administrative nature rather than some immutable characteristic of
the drug itself. "Here, however, although the drug vras denominated
a prescription drug, it was not dispensed as such. It was dispensed to
all comers at mass clinics without an individualized balancing by a
physician of the risks involved." "°°
In deciding that the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply
in the mass vaccine context, the court in Davis drew an analogy to the
situation where a manufacturer directly supplies a consumer with an
over-the-counter nonprescription drug.10l  In such a case, the
manufacturer cannot impose its own endorsement of the drug's worth
on the consumer."°  Rather, the manufacturer must provide the
consumer with the necessary information to weigh the benefits and
risks of the drug. 3 Moreover, when a manufacturer sells a drug to
an intermediate purchaser, the manufacturer must protect the
ultimate consumer's autonomy by either providing a warning to the
96. See id. at 130 (stating that directly warning physician is only effective means by which
warning would benefit patient).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. L at 131; see also Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th Cir.) (referring to
"assembly line" nature of mass immunization clinics), cwt derie4 419 US. 1095 (1974).
100. Davis, 399 F.2d at 131. Building on the Nmth Circuit's rationale, the Fifth Circuit later
expanded the mass vaccine clinic exception to the learned intermediary doctrine. S&- Givens
v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977). Whereas the court in Davisimposed a structural
distinction between mass clinics and private physicians, the Fifth Circuit in Givt ewauated the
nature of the private-physician scenario and determined that the dispensation of %mccinations
in the private physician scenario is more analogous to a visit to a mass clinic than a %isit o a
private physician's office, despite the presence of a physician. AL (finding that administration
of vaccine, although supervised by physician, resembled county health clinic setting).
101. Davis, 399 F.2d at 131.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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ultimate consumer or by contractually obligating the intermediate
purchaser to provide such a warning.1' Wyeth Laboratories, having
taken an active role in establishing the mass immunization clinic,
knew that the medical society was not providing warnings to the
vaccinees. ' The court therefore concluded that Wyeth had not
met its duty to warn the plaintiff of the risks of the sabin vaccine.106
The decision in Davis highlights one potential danger of congressio-
nal adoption of the learned intermediary doctrine under the Vaccine
Act. A large percentage of American children receive polio and DTP
vaccines in mass immunization clinics."0 When vaccines are dis-
pensed at a mass immunization clinic, the vaccinee is not likely to
receive the benefit of a physician's individualized risk assessment,0 3
and therefore, the rationale of the learned intermediary doctrine
weakens.' °  The Vaccine Act, consequently, may prevent these
children and their legal representatives from properly balancing the
benefits and risks of vaccination.
C. Problems with Physicians Serving as Learned Intermediaries
Mass vaccination exceptions aside, the learned intermediary
doctrine poses other dangers for vaccinees in the private physician
context. By not requiring direct warnings to vaccinees, the learned
intermediary doctrine implicitly assumes that private physicians will
undertake an individualized balancing of benefits and risks before
administering the vaccine. 0 The present state of the law concern-
ing informed consent for prescription drugs, however, does not
require full disclosure by the physician."' As a result, physicians
104. IL
105. Id.
106. IL
107. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 21, at 60 (stating that 50% of vaccines are
administered through public sector programs); see also Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1277
(5th Cir.) (discussing public health professor's testimony that majority of sabin polio vaccines
are administered in mass vaccination clinics), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
108. See supra notes 91-106 (discussing mass vaccine clinic exception to learned intermediary
doctrine).
109. Ryes, 498 F.2d at 1276 (validating learned intermediary doctrine on basis that physician
can perform informed risk assessment by applying knowledge of both drug and patient's medical
history).
110. Casey, supra note 70, at 957 (questioning willingness and ability of physicians to serve
as learned intermediaries); Styles, supra note 70, at 123 (arguing that physicians are not alvrays
willing to inform patients of prescription drug's risks).
111. Styles, supra note 70, at 128-29 (stating that customary practice standard for informed
consent requires physicians to warn patients only when medical community deems disclosure
necessary); Gerald F. Tietz, Informed Consent in the Presciption Drug Context: The Special Case, 61
WASH. L. REv. 367, 368 (1986) (arguing that informed consent doctrine does not adequately
protect patients who receive prescription drugs).
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may not involve vaccinees in the decisionmaking process.
1. Customary practice standard of informed consent
The informed consent doctrine imposes minimum vrarning duties
on physicians."' In the case of prescription drugs, courts have
generally held physicians to a "customary practice standard.""1
Under the customary practice standard, a physician is under a duty to
warn only if the medical community determines that disclosure is
mandated.1 4 The customary practice standard does not provide an
absolute warning requirement because the medical community itself
governs the scope of the duty to warn.115
As one scholar has commented, physicians are often unilling to
warn patients of the inherent risks of prescription drug use because
the physicians fear that too much informed consent may frighten the
patient and cause the patient to reject treatment.115 Plummer v.
Ledere Laboratories"7 provides a good example of this phenomenon.
The plaintiff, Harry Plummer, contracted polio shortly after his grand-
112. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.) (stating basic premise that
.every human being of adult years has a right to determine what shall be done with his o.n
body"), cert. deniA 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Maijorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Comsent to
Patiet Cwime A New Protected Inteest, 95 YALE U. 219, 226-27 (1985) (arguing that doctor's
responsibility for patient's well-being requires doctor to provide patient with sufficient
information to allow patient to make intelligent, informed decision); Styles, supra note 70, at 113
(stating that informed consent doctrine obligates doctors to wrma of proposed therapy's risks).
113. See eg., Watkins v. United States. 482 F. Supp. 1006, 1013 (hLD.Tenn. 1980) (holding
that physician was not required to warn patient of dermatological drug's side effects when giving
such warnings was not common practice of medical community); Filey v. United States, 314 F.
Supp. 905, 915 (NJD. Ohio 1970) (finding physician was not negligent because of lack of'expert
opinion that warning should have been given); Styles, supra note 70, at 128-29 (explaining that
customary practice standard is determined by customs of medical profession itsell, and is
therefore not absolute); Tetz, supra note II, at 309 (stating that medical customary practice
standard is based on medical community customs rather than patients' expectations).
Some jurisdictions, recognizing that the customary practice standard is determined r
physicians, have developed a more patient-oriented measure of informed consent. S& Cankuy,
464 F.2d at 784 (defining scope of duty to warn as "when a reasonable person, in what the
physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to atch
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed
therapy"). But see Styles, supra note 70, at 129 (stating that although Cantekrby standard still
governs in many jurisdictions, courts have not applied patient-oriented reasonableness test to
prescription pharmaceutical cases).
114. Watins; 482 F. Supp. at 1013 (requiring informed consent only where such consent is
standard practice in medical community); Finky, 314 F. Supp. at 915 (citing lack ofevidence of
community warning practice as reason for dismissal of failure to ,arm claim).
115. See Styles, supra note 70, at 128-29 (explaining that physician's duty to uarn only goes
so far as local medical community deems appropriate). For an argument suggesting a stricter
informed consent standard, see Canterbuy, 464 F.2d at 274 (arguing that informed consent
requires standard governing physicians rather than standard governed by physicians).
116. Styles, supra note 70, at 130; see also Casey, supra note 70, at 948 (observing that patient
may become intimidated by potential consequences or confused by medical terminology and
consequently reject treatment).
117. 819 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1987).
THE AMERicAN UNRsInY LAw REVIEw [Vol. 44:1853
daughter was injected with the sabin vaccine."' Lederle Laborato-
ries provided the administering physician with a warning detailing the
danger of individuals contracting polio upon contact with the
vaccinee.119 In a pre-trial deposition, Dr. Cohen, the administering
physician, made the following comments concerning his perceived
duty, as a learned intermediary, to warn the vaccinee:
My feeling... was that there is an extremely minute percentage
of people who will have the complications from the drug. I felt
that, again, because I had never experienced [other practicing
physicians] giving these warnings, it... wasn't necessary for me to
do it; and... I felt.., that giving the waring... could scare off
parents from bringing children in for future vaccinations, which to
me were much more important than the warning itself for the few
number of people who are going to contract disease ... 120
Plummer demonstrates how the learned intermediary doctrine may
result in physicians deciding not to perform an individualized
balancing of the benefits and risks of vaccination.' Given that the
manufacturer's duty to warn extends only to the physician, and the
physician's informed consent duty is governed by the community
practice standard, the vaccinee may receive neither a direct warning
nor a physician performed risk assessment.
2. The weakening of the learned intermediary doctrine in an environment
that supports universal vaccination
The dangers precipitated by the combined effect of the learned
intermediary doctrine and the community practice standard are
heightened in the vaccine context. 22 The current politico-medical
environment in the United States is exceedingly pro-vaccine. 123 For
example, the U.S. Government strongly endorses universal childhood
immunization, 124 and all fifty States mandate vaccination prior to
118. See Plummer v. Lederle Lab., 819 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 1987).
119. See id. (relating warning estimating one in six million chance of contracting contact
polio).
120. lM
121. See Casey, supra note 70, at 957 (arguing that physicians are not prepared to serve a
learned intermediaries); Tietz, supra note 111, at 367 (arguing that doctors do not inform
patients of important information about risks of serious side effects of prescription drug use)
(dtingJ. KArz, THE SILENT WoRLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 83 (1984)).
122. See Casey, supra note 70, at 957-58 (arguing that medical community's ability and
willingness to act as learned intermediary is overstated and that measuring scope of duty to vrn
by standard of practice of community affords, at best, only limited knowledge of risks asociated
with treatment).
123. 1&
124. See H.R. REP. No. 1063, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984) (urging creation of permanent
system to deliver comprehensive immunization services), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 4804,
4805.
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entry into the public school system.12
Such extensive federal and state support for universal vaccination
may have an overpersuasive effect on physicians. Physicians, respond-
ing to government propaganda and manufacturer advertising, may
become irreversibly persuaded by the value of vaccination and
abandon patient-by-patient risk assessments.2 6  When such
overpromotion occurs, the value of manufacturer warnings to
physicians becomes diluted.12
3. The responsibility of the manufacturer who has knowledge that its
warning is not being followed
The foregoing discussion demonstrates how the pro-vaccine
environment, in combination with the customary practice standard of
informed consent, diminishes physicians' abilities to function as
learned intermediaries. Prior to the passage of the Vaccine Act, state
common law provided a mechanism for combatting a physician's
inability or unvillingness to fully appreciate manufacturer warn-
ings.It In Incollingo v. Ewing," the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia addressed a manufacturer's failure to alter its warning in the face
of evidence that the drug was being used indiscriminately." The
plaintiffs submitted evidence that the drug, Chloromycetin, should
only be used in treating serious illnesses.' As the plaintiffs
125. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 21, at 103.
126. SeeJames b& Burke, DTP Controversy: An Assessment of the Liabilities of Manufadtum'e and
Administering Physidans Under Several Legal Theorim 17 SErON HALL L REV. 541,591-92 (1937)
(advocating that manufacturers respond to doctors' lack of objectivity ith"Dear Doctor" letters,
pamphlets, and other advertisements); Casey, supra note 70, at 957-58 (arguing that initially
adequate warnings may become insufficient when physician makes per se determination of
drug's value). Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1487 (D. Kan. 1937), pro ides an
illustration of the overpromotion phenomena. The plaintiff parents were provided with
information prepared by the Missouri Department of Health describing the risks of the whole-
cell vaccine, prior to their child receiving the DTP vaccination. Upon being asked questions
about the side effects of the vaccine, however, a nurse responded that the warnings were just
statistics" and that the adverse reactions "didn't really happen." Id. The plaintiff infant
daughter sustained severe and irreversible brain damage. Id. at 1485.
127. See Burke, supra note 126, at 591-92 (stating that pro-vaccine environment creates false
perception of utility of vaccines); Casey, supra note 70, at 957-58 (arguing that overpromotion
leads to manufacturers' disregard for warnings).
128. See, ag., Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359,1362 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that
manufacturer who knowingly ignores that warning is being disregarded may be liable for failure
to warn); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 222 (Pa. 1971) (holding that manufacturer with
knowledge that learned intermediaries are ignoring othenise valid warnings may be liable for
failure to warn); Burke, supra note 126, at 592 (arguing that manufacturers ignoring
environment in which their products are distributed may be liable for failure to war under
learned intermediary doctrine).
129. 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971).
130. Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A2d 205, 222 (Pa. 1971).
131. See id.
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brought to light, however, physicians were prescribing the drug to
treat non-serious illnesses.1 2 In reviewing the trial court's judgment
for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a jury
instruction that the manufacturer's knowledge of, and subsequent
inattention to, the fact that the drug was being used indiscriminately
could result in a finding of negligence: "When a required warning is
retained unchanged in the face of being widely disregarded, and the
supplier knows or has reason to know of such wide disregard, a jury
may be permitted to find the warning insufficient."'
Incollingo attaches liability to a manufacturer that possesses either
actual or constructive knowledge that its warning is being ig-
nored."s Applying the Incollingo rationale to the vaccine context,
a trier of fact might find that the manufacturer failed to take
adequate steps to remedy the fact that the pro-vaccine national
environment has lessened physicians' ability to serve as effective
learned intermediaries.3 5
Unfortunately, Congress did not include in the Vaccine Act a tort
mechanism for overcoming physicians inability to serve as learned
intermediaries. t  Congress could have achieved this end in one of
two ways. It could have required physicians to warn vaccinees
directly" 7 or, more in keeping with the learned intermediary
doctrine, Congress could have required manufacturers to neutralize
the pro-vaccine environment by mandating the use of "Dear Doctor"
letters, which provide additional warnings to physicians, and other
forms of advertising likely to reach the medical profession. 13
Rather than requiring manufacturers to recognize environmental
barriers to physician warnings, the Vaccine Act creates a presumption
that warnings that comply with federal regulatory standards are ade-
quate)3 9  This presumption will likely negate the environmental
132. See id.
133. IM.
134. See id.; Burke, supra note 126, at 592 (arguing that charging manufacturers with
knowledge of environment wili help restore objectivity of physician warnings).
135. SeeBurke, supra note 126, at 592 (asserting that manufacturers have duty to "neutralize
the effect of overpromotion" by using any available means, including advertisements, pamphicts,
and even "Dear Doctor" letters).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(a)-(c) (1988) (discussing standards of responsibility with regard
to warnings).
137. See Casey, supra note 70, at 958 (arguing that patients are not as susceptible to
overpromotion as physidans are because manufacturers of prescription drugs do not generally
market to patients).
138. Burke, supra note 126, at 592.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b) (2).
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awareness charged to manufacturers by cases such as Incollingo,140
and as a result, vaccinees may once again suffer from a lack of
individualized balancing by a learned intermediary.
D. Importance of Informed Consent After Immunization
Although the duty to warn is an important component of ensuring
product safety, one scholar has argued that the necessity of informed
consent is nullified by the fact that all fifty States mandate vaccination
prior to entry into the public school system."' According to this
argument, Congress' endorsement of the learned intermediary
doctrine will not effect the results of individualized balancing because
the States have already concluded that the benefits of universal
vaccination outweigh the risks." As a result, in theory, Congress'
decision to adopt the learned intermediary doctrine simply amounts
to the discharging of useless individual risk assessments."
This argument fails to recognize that informed consent plays a role
in post-vaccination decisionmaking, as well as in the initial decision
whether or not to vaccinate.'" Although doctors perform a valu-
able role in communicating complex medical information to patients,
the patient nonetheless benefits from a direct warning. After a
patient receives a vaccination, a period of time exists, which is
sometimes quite large, in which adverse reactions are likely to
occur." An informed patient is better able to recognize the signs
of an adverse reaction before the reaction becomes debilitating.14
Because the vaccinee does not reside with the physician, the
140. See Incolingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 222 (Pa. 1971) (holding drug manufacturer
responsible for restricting drug use to "proper situations" where manufacturer knew or should
have known of widespread misuse). The adequacy presumption created by the Vaccine Act is
not easily rebutted. In order to rebut the presumption, plaintiffs must show that the
manufacturer participated in a fraudulent, intentional, or wrongful withholding of information
from the Secretary, or prove by clear and convincing evidence that the manufacturer did not
exercise due care. Id.
141. SeeSpence, supra note 36, at 732 (discussing argument that statev accination laws. which
require vaccinations prior to matriculation, remove choice element and therefore prevent
vaccine from being proximate cause of vaccinee's injury).
142. See Spence, supra note 36, at 732-34.
143. Spence, supra note 36, at 732-34.
144. See Casey, supra note 70, at 959 (explaining that patient plays important role in
monitoring signs and symptoms of adverse reactions after use of drug); Tietz, supra note 111,
at 389 (arguing that patient plays important role in monitoring adverse reactions to prescription
drugs).
145. Tietz, supra note 111, at 389.
146. See Tietz, supra note 111, at 389 (asserting that prescription drug therapy requires
continuous monitoring depending on patient's auareness of side effects and theirsymptoms in
order to avoid time lag between ingestion of drug and side effect); s=e also Casey, supra note 70,
at 359 (suggesting that doctor's role in detecting signs of adverse reactions ceases once patient
leaves doctor's office).
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physician's knowledge of the adverse reaction does little good in the
post-vaccine scenario unless the physician has communicated the
warning to the vaccinee.'47 In the interest of minimizing adverse
reactions, a direct-warning rule better ensures that the patient is able
to evaluate signs and symptoms than does the learned intermediary
doctrine as applied under the community practice standard,'
Even though patients may not legally reject vaccination, the absence
of either a direct warning or a thorough balancing by a learned
intermediary still puts the vaccinee's health at risk.
E. Vaccine Act's Informational and Recording Requirements
As the preceding discussion indicates, the Vaccine Act's preemption
of direct failure to warn claims may actually increase the net number
of vaccinees who do not receive sufficient warnings. The question
thus arises whether the recording and informational requirements
imposed by the Vaccine Act adequately compensate for the safety
features sacrificed by eliminating direct failure to warn causes of
action.
1. Vaccine informational materials
Concerning direct warnings for vaccinees, the Act requires that the
Secretary furnish health care providers with vaccine information.19
This information must discuss the benefits of the vaccine, the
potential risks of the vaccine, the existence of the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program, and other relevant information. 150
Health care providers are then required to distribute the information
to the legal representative of the vaccinees.151
The vaccine information required by the Vaccine Act has a number
of advantages. It allows the vaccinee or the vaccinee's legal represen-
tative to take an active role in the decision whether to vaccinate.15 2
147. SeeTietz, supra note 111, at 389 (highlighting patient awareness of potential side effects
as crucial in order for drug therapy monitoring process to be effective, thereby requiring patient
to be "coparticipant" in process).
148. SeeTietz, supra note 111, at 389 (noting that patient compliance with prescription drug
therapy improves when patient is informed directly, rather than if physician treats patient as
inactive participant).
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-26(a)-(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
150. leL § 300aa-2(c)(1)-(4).
151. See id § 300aa-26(d) (2) (1988) (requiring physician to provide vaccine information
material prior to administration of vaccine).
152. See iU. § 300aa-26(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (mandating dissemination of vaccine
information by health care providers to legal representatives or vaccinees). The very nature of
the information that the Secretary must include in the vaccine information-benefits, risks, and
compensation for injuries-offers the vaccinee the opportunity to consider for herself the
benefits and risks of vaccination.
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As discussed earlier, one of the policy considerations underlying the
learned intermediary doctrine is that vaccinees often do not have the
requisite medical knowledge to understand direct warnings.1 a Now,
however, the vaccine information creates a framework for performing
a risk-benefit analysis and thus permits the vaccinee to participate in
the ultimate decision. In addition, by requiring physicians to provide
vaccinees with written information, the Vaccine Act serves, in part, to
objectify the pro-vaccine environment. The written information
removes some of the discretion formerly allocated to the physician
under the customary practice standard of informed consent."
2. Health care provider recording requirements
In addition to the Vaccine Act's mandate that physicians provide
vaccinees with reliable information, the Act requires that physicians
engage in certain recording practices with respect to the administra-
tion of vaccinations."s  By requiring physicians to report certain
recognizable events following vaccination, the Vaccine Act serves to
combat the lack of individualized balancing by physicians that has
occurred as a result of the excessively pro-vaccine environmentL"S
153. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
154. See Styles, supra note 70, at 128-29 (discussing customary practice standard of informed
consent). Under the community practice standard, a physician, as a learned intermediary, is
only required to communicate to the patient information that is deemed necessary by the
medical community. Id. The Vaccine Act replaces thejudgment of the medical community with
the judgment of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HIS). rd;
see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-26(a) (1988) (requiiing HIHS Secretary to develop vaccine
information). The Act, however, may still rely on physician discretion to the extent that it
requires doctors to supplement the vaccine information with oral explanations in "appropriate
cases" without specifying who is to make this determination. Id. § 300aa-26(d) (Supp. V 1993).
Given the Act's silence as to the meaning of "appropriate cases," i&, physicians providing
supplementary vaccine information may still be governed by the community practice standard.
This result is no different than if Congress had required manufacturers to provide direct
warnings to physicians. In both cases, the vaccinee has a finite amount of written information
upon which the physician may or may not add his or her medical knowledge. This scenario is
at least an improvement over a learned intermediary doctrine without a regulatory imposition
of patient warnings.
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-25(b) (1) (A)-(C) (1988) (detailing recording requirements for
health care providers and manufacturers). The recording mandate requires that health care
providers and manufacturers report to the Secretary the following information:
(A) the occurrence of any event set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table, induding the
events set forth in section 300-14(b) of this title which occur within 7 days of the
administration of any vaccines set forth in the Table or within such longer period as
is specified in the table or section, (B) the occurrence of any contraindicating reaction
to a vaccine which is specified in the manufacturer's package insert, and (C) such
other matters as the Secretary may by regulation require.
L
156. Compare i. (setting out reporting requirements for health care providers and
manufacturers) with Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 222 (Pa. 1971) (charging manufacturer
with knowledge of environment in which drugs are distributed). The Vaccine Act approaches
the problem of environmental overpromotion in a different manner than the court in Inrlitngo,
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Pursuant to the recording requirements, even if a physician should
forego an initial risk-benefit analysis, she is required to report adverse
reactions and contraindications.'57
The reporting scheme may play a significant role in reducing
DTP-related adverse reactions. Because the DTP vaccine is given in
three installments, the reporting requirements may encourage
physicians to either eliminate or delay the second and third doses
when a potential problem manifests itself. The health care provider
recording mandates, therefore, may help reestablish the individualized
physician balancing that the authors of the learned intermediary
doctrine assumed would take place.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
The Federal Government, through Congress and through the FDA,
has played a key role in the development of American vaccine
policy.' In designing the Vaccine Act, Congress had the opportu-
nity to assert complete federal control over vaccine regulation by
explicitly preempting state tort actions. 5 9 Congress, however, left
petitioners with the option of pursuing civil tort actions,16" although
it created a presumption that manufacturers in compliance with FDA
standards satisfy their warning duties' 6' and prohibited direct
warning actions. 62
The congressional decision not to completely preempt state
common law raises important questions about the proper relationship
between federal regulatory and state common law regimes. On the
one hand, given the Federal Government's predominate role in
which suggested that manufacturers be required to evaluate the state of mind of physicias
receiving their warnings. Incollingo, 282 A.2d at 222. The Vaccine Act requires physicians to
report directly certain contraindicating events. 42 U.S.C. § 00aa-25(b)(1)(A)-(C).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 00aa-25(b)(1)(A)-(B).
158. See, eg., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-392 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(setting forth various policies regarding, inter alia, representation, revocation, certification, and
required recording and reporting of information concerning various drugs); Public Health
Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 241-289 (1988) (enumerating general powers and duties of Public
Health Service, and establishing and specifying role and function of various medical institutions,
services, and systems); Jennie Clarke, Federal Preemption: A Vacdne Manufadurers Defense, 56
UMKC L. REV. 515, 525-28 (1988) (documenting growth of federal involvement In vaccine
regulation throughout 20th century).
159. SeeJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (holding that Congress may
preempt state law by explicitly announcing its intention in language of statute); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (concluding that scheme of federal regulation may
be so highly pervasive as to allow reasonable inference that Congress intended to leave no room
for States to supplement it).
160. 42 U.S.C. § S00aa-22(e) (1988).
161. Id. § 300aa-22(b)(2).
162. Id. § 300aa-22(c).
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twentieth century vaccine regulation, one can argue that the Vaccine
Act should have explicitly declared vaccine regulation to be an
exclusively federal matter." On the other hand, one can also
argue that the Federal Government has exercised too much influence
by passing the Vaccine Act. According to this view, the Vaccine Act's
creation of a presumption that warnings are adequate if they comply
with FDA standards paralyzes States' common law ability to function
as a vehicle for protecting its citizens from the dangers of inadequate
warnings." This section examines the inherent tension between
federal regulation and state common law as these systems apply to the
regulation of vaccine warnings.
A. The Preemption Doctrine
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, in announcing the supremacy
of federal law, provides the basis for the preemption doctrine.'6
Federal courts have recognized tvo types of preemption: statutory
and regulatory." Although stemming from different sources of
federal law, both types1 '6 preempt state statutes, regulations, and
common law.' 6
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that express language indicating
a federal intent to preempt state law is a sufficient but not necessary
condition for a finding of federal preemption.16 Preemption may
163. Cf. Naile, supra note 36, at 689 (noting that all aspects of vacdne design, manufacturing,
and labelling are overseen by FDA).
164. SeeRichard C.Ausness, FederalPreemption ofSt aePduILabi'Doarbnrzm 44 S.C. L REV.
187, 276-77 (1993) (arguing that FDA only responds to -arnings submitted by manufacturers
and therefore may not be approving safest possible uarnings).
165. See U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 2 (This Constitution, and the Law3 of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."); =e alo
Ausness, supranote 164, at 191 (stating that Supremacy Clause is basis forpreemption doctrine);
Naile, supra note 36, at 683 (stating that Supremacy Clause gives Congress power to override
state law).
166. See Clarke, supra note 158, at 539; Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr. & Carter G. Philip3
Federal Preemptio. A Comment on Regudat Preemption Afler Hilsbromt gh Couny, 18 UMn 589, 591
n.1O (1986).
167. See Ausness, supra note 164, at 191.
168. SeeAusness, supra note 164, at 191 (explaining that state common law, as well as state
legislation, is preempted by federal law); Clarke, supra note 158, at 531 (stating that both
statutory and regulatory preemption override laws promulgated by state legislatures and state
courts); see also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 US. 141, 153 (stating that
"federal regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes7); Clarke, supra note
158, at 530 (noting that courts have used same principles in finding both statutory and
regulatory preemption).
169. See, eg.,Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 US. 519,525 (1977) (stating that preemption
"is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose"); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal
Inc., 411 U.S. 624,633(1973) (holding that federal law may expressly orimpliedlypreemptstate
law); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that federal law may
preempt state law either explicitly or implicitly).
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also occur where federal intent to maintain exclusive control is
implicit in the "structure and purpose" of the federal law. 70  The
test for implied preemption is whether the federal law in question is
so comprehensive as to occupy the entire field.'
Additionally, courts must find preemption where a conflict exists
between state and federal laws. 72 Conflict preemption has three
distinct subcategories: 73 first, when compliance with both federal
and state law is impossible; 74 second, when state law interferes with
the objectives of federal law;' 75 and third, when state law obstructs
the methods used to achieve federal objectives. 76
In understanding preemption analysis, one must consider the limits
to the preemption doctrine. The mere possibility of conflict between
state and federal law does not lead to preemption.'7 7  Rather, the
conflict must "necessarily exist."78 Additionally, the concept of
federalism carries with it a presumption against preemption.
79
Fearful of interfering with States rights, courts are very reluctant to
preempt state law in areas of traditional state regulation. 80 Issues
concerning health and safety are primary examples of traditional
areas of state regulation.' 8'
170. Jones, 430 U.S. at 525.
171. SeePacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dcv. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (holding that dominant nature of federal interest will create
presumption that state enforcement of law on same subject is prohibited); Fidelity Fed. Say. &
LoanAss'n, 458 U.S. at 153 (finding implied preemption where federal regulation is so pervasive
that it gives rise to inference that Congress completely occupied field).
172. See Fudlity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 153 (holding that conflict results in
nullification of state law to extent of conflict with federal law).
173. See Ausness, supra note 164, at 196-97.
174. See Fidelity Fe Say. &Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 153; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
175. See Fuelity Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 153; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941).
176. See Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability and Preemption: Ajudicial Frameworh, 39 BUFF. L,
REV. 181, 186 (1991); see also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987)
(finding that dumping claims under state law interfered with federal method of compliance with
Clean Water Act).
177. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973) (explaining importance of
distinguishing between "possible and "necessary" conflicts); Atwell, supra note 176, at 186
(arguing that actual conflict must exist to trigger conflict preemption doctrine).
178. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 555 (1973) (holding that only necessary conflict warrants
overriding state law).
179. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("'[W)e start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress'" (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
180. Ld. (citing need to achieve balance between federal and state rights); see also United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (stating that absent clear intent from Congress, Court
will be reluctant to impose balance between federal and state rights).
181. Atwell, supra note 176, at 188; see also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab.,
471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985) (explaining presumption of peaceful coexistence between state and
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B. FDA Regulation of the Vaccine Industry
Arguments favoring federal preemption of state tort law remedies
for vaccine injuries focus on the comprehensive nature of the FDA's
regulation of the vaccine industry.12 In order to assess such argu-
ments, this Comment initially reviews the history and present state of
the FDA's role in federal vaccine policy.8s3
The Federal Government's involvement with vaccine regulation
began with the passage of the Virus, Serum, Toxin Act of 1902.1'
Under this federal legislation, the Public Health Service, and later the
Department of Treasury, regulated the vaccine industry."s Al-
though the names of the various administrative branches have
changed over time,186 the Federal Government has remained active
in vaccine regulation throughout the twentieth century."s Present-
ly, the FDA's Center for Drug and Biologics bears primary responsibil-
ity for vaccine regulation.'
Pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,'1
the FDA is the primary regulator of vaccines.19 The FDA meets its
obligations in a two-fold manner. The FDA promotes public health
by approving the use of new and safe treatments."' The FDA also
protects public health by removing unsafe and ineffective drugs from
the market."9 As the federal guardian of vaccine safety, the FDA
federal health and safety regulations).
182. See eg., Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 651 F. Supp. 993, 999 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (stating that
comprehensiveness of federal regulation demonstrates implied congressional intent to preempt
state tort law), wvvd on othergrounds, 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988); Naile, supra note 36, at 689
(arguing that comprehensiveness of federal regulations leaves no room for state tort law).
183. For a comprehensive overview of FDA vaccine regulation, see Clarke, supm note 158,
at 525-29.
184. Pub. L No. 57-274, 32 Stat. 728 (1902) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 141-143 (1988)); se
Clarke, supra note 158, at 525 (describing allocation of regulatory responses during 20th
century).
185. Clarke, supra note 158, at 525 (noting that Congress passed 1902 Act following deaths
of 12 children resulting from tetanus contamination from diphtheria and tetanus vaccine).
186. See Clarke, supra note 158, at 525. In 1944, Congress passed the Public Health Service
Act (PHSA). Pub. L No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682, 702 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1938)).
The PHSA incorporated the Virus, Serum, Toxin Act and transferred regulatory responsibilities
to the Federal Security Agency. Clarke, supra note 158, at 525. The Division of Biologics
Standards (DBS), a subsidiary of the National Institutes of Health, assumed regulatory authority
in 1955. Id In 1972, DBS evolved into the FDA's Bureau of Biologics. Id. at 525-26.
187. See supra notes 163-81 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Government's role
in 20th century vaccine regulation).
188. Clarke, supra note 158, at 526 (explaining that FDA's Office of Biologics Research and
Review and the Bureau of Drugs together form the Center for Drugs and Biologics).
189. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
190. 21 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (granting Secretary regulatory power).
191. 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (1985) (explaining FDA's attempt to rewrite revision in order to
expedite approval process for beneficial drugs).
192. IM (describing protective role played by FDA).
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has issued comprehensive regulations for the design and manufacture
of vaccines. 93
The FDA's regulation of vaccines begins prior to the manufacturing
stage." Initially, a potential manufacturer must apply to the FDA
for a license to manufacture the vaccine." FDA regulations require
manufacturers to submit a sample lot of the vaccine and summaries
of tests run on the lot.' 8 These regulations take into account not
only the vaccine itself, but also employee qualifications and responsi-
bilities,'9 as well as the condition of the manufacturer's work
area.'
98
The FDA has promulgated additional, specific rules for the
production of the pertussis component of the DTP vaccine.11
Manufacturers must test every lot of the pertussis component for
potency 2u and toxicity.20' A written release from the FDA serves
as final approval of the DTP lot.
2 2
In addition to regulating design and manufacture, the FDA
carefully evaluates the labelling of vaccines.203 The FDA requires
that labels include the makeup of the vaccine, the administration
schedule, and the indications and contraindications for usage." Of
particular importance to the preemption discussion is the fact that the
FDA must approve all language contained in a vaccine label.05
Once certain language is approved, manufacturers may not change
label language without first filing a supplemental new drug applica-
tion with the FDA.206 Manufacturers who alter warning language
193. Clarke, supra note 158, at 527.
194. See 21 C.F.R. § 601.1 (1994) (requiring both establishment and product license).
195. Ud
196. See id. § 601.2 (requiring manufacturer to submit "data derived from nonclinical
laboratory and clinical studies which demonstrate that the manufactured product meets
prescribed standards of safety, purity, and potency").
197. See id. § 211.25 (requiring that all persons involved in manufacturing process have
education, training, and experience necessary to carry out assignment).
198. See id. § 600.10 (allowing only designated individuals into vaccine-processing area).
199. See id. §§ 620.1 to .6 (providing requirements for propagation of bacteria, bacterial
content, detoxification, potency tests, toxicity tests, dosage, and labelling).
200. See id. § 620.4 (prescribing laboratory test using mice as samples); see also TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICIONARY 1359 (16th ed. 1985) (defining potency as "strength of
medicine").
201. See 21 C.F.R. § 620.5 (requiring toxicity test using mice as samples); see also TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICIONARY, supra note 200, at 1883 (defining toxicity as "the extent,
quality, or degree of being poisonous").
202. 21 C.F.R. § 610.2 (stating that "a manufacturer shall not distribute a lot of a product
until the lot is released by the Director").
203. See, e.g., id. §§ 610.60 to .65 (describing labelling requirements for DTP vaccine).
204. IM
205. id § 601.12.
206. Id.; Clarke, supra note 158, at 529.
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without FDA approval face criminal prosecution. 2W
The FDA, in deciding whether to approve or reject certain vrarning
language, promotes a policy of uniform labelling and warnings.2a
While manufacturers must provide adequate vrarnings, manufacturers
cannot insulate themselves from liability by issuing overly broad
warnings. All information contained in vaccine labels and vrarnings
must have clinical relevance.2' The FDA only permits warnings
about known hazards, not theoretical possibilities.210
C. Premption Case Law
1. The courts' rejection of pemwption claims brought by vacxine
manufacturers
In the vaccine context, courts generally have not found an intent
by Congress, or any agency, to preempt a State's failure to warn cause
of action.2 1' The Fourth Circuit's decision in Abbot v. American
Cyanamid Co.212 provides a well-organized discussion of the issues
involved in the warning preemption debate. The plaintiff, after
receiving a DTP vaccination manufactured by American Cyanamid,
suffered severe neurologic injuries.1  Raising a motion for summa-
ryjudgment, the manufacturer argued that the plaintiff's failure to
warn and design defect theories were preempted. American
Cyanamid offered what the Fourth Circuit described as a "broad" and
a "narrow" preemption argument.
American Cyanamid's "broad" argument, essentially an occupation
of field claim, insisted that the comprehensive nature of federal
207. Clarke, supra note 158, at 529; see also21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(3) (stating that FDA will
revoke manufacturer's license and hold agency hearing for noncompliance if manufacturer fails
to report labelling changes).
208. See50 Fed. Reg. 51,402 (1985) (naming uniformity as goal of regulation).
209. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,442 (1979) (linitingrelev-antphannacological information to thatwhich
is of significant, normal, and practical clinical applicability).
210. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(c) (requiring that manufacturers base arnings on "data derived
from human experience" and not on claims where there is inadequate evidence). The
regulations further mandate that conclusions based on animal data shall be identified as such.
Id.
211. See Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 863 F.2d 1173, 1176 (5th Cir. 1988) (collecting federal and
state decisions rejecting preemption claims); Knudsen v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 1346 (I.D.
Fla. 1987); Foyle v. Lederle Lab., 674 F. Supp. 530 (E.D.N.C. 1987); Martinkovic v. Wyeth Lab.,
669 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. IlL 1987); Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 (QD. Cal.
1987); MacGillivray v. Lederle Lab., 667 F. Supp. 743 (D.NIL 1987); Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666
F. Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987), car. deniA, 498 U.S. 981 (1990); VWackv. Lederle Lab., 666 F.
Supp. 123 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Patten v. Lederle Lab., 655 F. Supp. 745 (D. Utah 1987).
212. 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.), cert. deni-A 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
213. SeAbbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1110 (4th Cir.). eat, d ee, 488
U.S. 908 (1988).
214. See id
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vaccine regulation left no room for state regulation. 5 American
Cyanamid cited the detailed labelling requirements imposed by FDA
regulations as evidence that the FDA intended to regulate exclusively
all aspects of vaccine labelling.216 American Cyanamid argued that
because the federal requirements regulated virtually every detail of
the label, there should be no room for state action.1
The Fourth Circuit, however, refused to find preemption based
upon occupation of field, stating that the comprehensiveness of
federal regulations does not result in a per se finding of preemp-
tion.21" The court began with the premise that issues addressed by
congressional legislation are matters of national concern.210 Every
issue addressed by Congress, however, does not preclude concurrent
state law. 220  Instead, proponents of federal preemption must
overcome several adverse presumptions. 2 21  First, health and safety
matters are traditionally areas of state concern and are not easily
found to be preempted.2 z Second, given that agencies promulgate
215. See id. at 1111-12.
216. See id. at 1112; see also supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text (discussing labelling
requirements).
217. Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1112.
218. Xd (citing Hilisborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985))
(stating that although all matters addressed by Congress are of national concern, not all matters
of national concern warrant preemption). But seeNaile, supra note 36, at 690. Naile argues that
DTP regulations are distinguishable from the blood regulations in HillUsborough County. IX. First,
the local interest in blood collection, the subject addressed by the court in Hillsborough County,
is stronger than the local interest in vaccine regulation. Id Second, the local regulations did
not require the collectors to violate federal regulations, while state tort law may require vaccine
manufacturers to violate FDA regulations. Id Third, the FDA blood collection regulations
expressly state their intent of nonexcdusivity, while FDA vaccine regulations do not make a
similar admission of nonexclusivity. I.
Each of Naile's three arguments distinguishing Hihsborough County from the vaccine
preemption debate misses a crucial point. By arguing that blood collection is a stronger local
interest than vaccine regulation, Naile ignores the utilitarian benefits of infectious disease
control. Local governments, acting in the best interest of their constituents, have a strong
interest in establishing strong preventive vaccination programs. Concerning the argument that
state tort verdicts might compel violation of federal vaccine regulations, Naile ignores the fact
that the possibility of conflict is not a sufficient ground for preemption. See Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973) (distinguishing between possibility of conflict and
inevitability of conflict). Finally, the lack of an affirmative statement of nonexclusivity in FDA
vaccine regulations does not distinguish HiUsborough County. "When preemption by regulation
is considered, courts are reluctant to find preemption by federal regulations when the agency
does not make very clear an intent of preemption since agencies normally address problems in
a detailed manner." Abbo4 844 F.2d at 1112.
219. Abbo4 844 F.2d at 1112.
220. 1X (noting that mere existence of federal legislation does not preempt all related state
law).
221. Id. The Court noted that preemption is difficult to find when: (1) Congress did not
expressly manifest its intention to preempt, i& (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 726
(1981)); (2) the preemption argument is based on the comprehensiveness of federal
regulations, i (citing Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 717); or (3) no federal remedy exists, id.
(citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
222. l14; Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 715.
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very detailed regulations, 2 3 regulations lacking a clear intent to
preempt presumptively do not occupy the field. 4
American Cyanamid's "narrow" preemption argument took the
form of a conflict of policy objectives, claiming that state tort law
interfered with the intended effects of the federal vaccine policy. '
According to the Fourth Circuit, the federal objective of FDA
regulations was to promote vaccine safety. 6 The defendant argued
that, in addition to safety, federal vaccine policy is committed to
protecting the availability and use of the vaccines. - The imposi-
tion of excessive state tort law liability, the defendant argued,
frustrates these policy objectives by driving manufacturers from the
market." In considering American Cyanamid's motion for summa-
ryjudgment based on a policy objectives conflict, the court framed
the issue as "whether the federal interest requires that federal
regulations be viewed as having struck the balance between safety and
quantity or whether the regulations merely establish minimum safety
standards and allow state regulation to establish the balance."2
In an attempt to discern the nature of the federal policy that
American Cyanamid claimed was harmed by state regulations, the
Fourth Circuit turned to the Vaccine Actm As a preliminary
matter, the court rejected the defendant's argument that because the
Vaccine Act does not expressly address preemption it is neutral on the
matter." Rather, the court turned to the Vaccine Act's legislative
history 1 2 and found two assumptions weighing against a finding of
223. See Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1113 (citing Hilsborough County, 471 U.S. at 718).
224. See id. at 1112 (noting that courts are more reluctant to infer preemption from
comprehensiveness of regulations than from comprehensiveness of statutes).
225. See id. at 1113.
226. See id. (stating overall goal of legislation is safety of drugs and biological products).
227. See id.; see alsoNaile, supra note 36, at 527 (listing objectives of federal imccine regulation
as safety and efficiency).
228. SeeAbbot, 844 F.2d at 1113.
229. Id.; see also Hileborough County, 471 U.S. at 721 (holding that federal objective of blood
collection regulations was to establish minimum standards, not to strike balance of saftcy and
quality). For other cases viewing federal regulations as minimum standards, see Brochu v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981); Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co.. 520 F.2d
1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975); Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1060-67 (3d Cir. 1974);
MacGillivray v. Lederle Lab., 667 F. Supp. 743, 746 (D.N.M. 1987); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732
P.2d 297, 311 n.12 (Idaho 1987), cert. den"d 485 U.S. 942 (1988); Wooderson v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1055 (Kan.), art. dmd 469 US. 965 (1984); Feldman
v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 390 (N.J. 1984).
230. See Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1113-14 (viewing Vaccine Act as most recent statutory expression
of federal vaccine policy).
231. Id. at 1113.
232. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6, nprintcd in 1986 US.C.CAN. at 6345
(stating that prior to passage of Vaccine Act, civil tort system s sole compensation
mechanism).
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preemption.33 First, the Vaccine Act recognizes that prior federal
vaccine legislation, specifically the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act?' and the Public Health Service Act,2a does not preempt state
tort actions.2 6 Second, the Vaccine Act expressly states that state
tort actions remain available to aggrieved parties.23 7  Finding that
the Vaccine Act did not evince a federal intent to strike an immutable
balance between vaccine safety and availability, the court refused to
adopt the opposite policy determination. 238
2. Preemption and the physical conflict dilemma
In Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories,9 (Hurley 1H) the Fifth Circuit, like
the Fourth Circuit in Abbot, did not find that FDA regulations
completely preempted state warning claims.2" The Fifth Circuit
did, however, recognize that specific FDA regulations may result in a
233. Abbo4 844 F.2d at 1113.
234. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
235. 42 U.S.C. §§ 200 to 300aaa-13 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
236. Abbo4 844 F.2d at 1113. While the court did not cite the specific language of the
Vaccine Act, it noted that the purpose of the two earlier acts was to promote "the safety of dues
and biologic products." Id. Moreover, the court noted that the Vaccine Act is "replete" with
the assumption that "state tort and contract actions are available without preemption by earlier
federal legislation." Id.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(a) (1988) (stating that except as otherwise provided, state law
applies to vaccine injury civil actions); Abbo, 844 F.2d at 1113.
238. Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1114. In Hurley v. Ledere Lab., the Fifth Circuit delivered an even
stronger admonishment against the federal judiciary determining the objectives of federal
vaccine policy. Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 863 F.2d 1173,1177 (5th Cir. 1988) (Hurley H), rcvg651
F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (Hurley I). The court in Hurley /acknowledged the theoretical
possibility of removing state tort liability in order to further the policy objective of increasing
vaccine supplies. Id. The court then proceeded to demonstrate that the wisdom of such a
policy decision is uncertain. First, preempting state tort law might promote consumer insecurity
concerning the quality of vaccines. Id. Second, the price increases caused by state tort damages
may be passed on to the Federal Government, thereby eliminating the very need to preempt
state tort law. Id. Given the potentially adverse consequences that would arise from a finding
that state tort law conflicted with the objectives of federal vaccine policy, the Fifth Circuit found
that there was no sufficient evidence on which to declare state tort law preempted. Id.
Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hurley I reversed a decision by the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas finding preemption based on, inter alia, an objectives
conflict. Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 651 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (Hurky 1), reuld, 863 F,2d
1173 (5th Cir. 1988) (Hurley H1). In Hurley I, the district court found that allowing individual
States to dictate warnings standards would irreparably harm the federal policy of varning
uniformity. Id. at 1005-06.
With the Vaccine Act as a guide, the Fifth Circuit in Hurley 1I established a better and more
consistent decision than the district court in Hurley I. The Vaccine Act's legislative history
alleviates the need for courts to choose between indeterminative policy considerations. If
Congress did not believe that state law warning actions damaged the Act's policy favoring
uniformity, courts no longer have a need to find an objectives conflict.
239. Hurley If, 863 F.2d at 1173.
240. See id. (recognizing that in limited instances state law may conflict with federal law or
regulations but finding that manufacturer's arguments so broadly phrased as to preempt all state
product liability law for vaccine). The court noted that there should be a reluctance to find that
"federal law implicitly preempts state law." Id.
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limited preemption of state tort law when a manufacturer cannot
satisfy a federal regulation without violating state law and vice
versa.241  This reasoning represented a compromise between two
competing concerns. On the one hand, courts would place manufac-
turers in an inescapable bind by finding the FDA-approved varning
insufficient. In order to meet a state-warning standard, the manufac-
turer would have to violate federal law.2' On the other hand, the
court in Hurley Ilfound limits to the value of FDA-approved warnings.
Given that the FDA only evaluates warnings based on the information
submitted by manufacturers, the FDA's role in the warning evaluation
process is somewhat "passive." 21 In approving designs, the FDA
only considers the sufficiency of the proposed designs and does not
consider alternative designs or regulation schemes.2  The vrarnings
approved by the FDA, therefore, may not represent the safest
potential warnings, for the FDA may not have considered the full
universe of relevant information.
241. See i. at 1179 (finding that specific FDA approval of manufacturer warning preempts
state inadequate warning claim, assuming FDA has all relevant information to make approval
decision).
242. Id. For arguments that physical conflicts, where the manufacturer cannot concurrently
satisfy both federal and state law, place vaccine manufacturers in an unfair position, see HurLq
, 651 F. Supp. at 1000 (arguing that Texas common law determination of inadequate warnings
can create physical conflict with FDA standards). Se also Clarke, supra note 158, at 536-37
(asserting that state court juries often impose warning duties inconsistent with federal
regulations); Naile, supra note 36, at 689 (arguing that state tort liability punishes manufacturer
for not violating federal law).
Broader policy arguments against allowing state courts to find failure to vrn liability are
often raised in conjunction with the foregoing physical conflict arguments. Many argue that the
FDA is in a better position to establish and judge warning standards than are state judges and
juries. See ag., Pennington P. Landon, Federal Prmnplion and the Drug Industry: Can Courts
Go-Regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. LJ. 85, 116-17 (1988); Alan SchwarMz, PrWpsasforPfedur1s
Liabilily Refonm A Theordical Synthesis, 97 YALE LJ. 353,389 (1988). FDA offidals have superior
resources and superior technical expertise with which to make complicated safety policy
decisions. Ausness, supra note 164, at 276. To allow state judges andjuries to second-guess FDA
standards defeats the safety enforcement structure that Congress established through its creation
of the FDA. See Naile, supra note 36, at 694 (arguing thatjuy e-aluation of FDA standards
frustrates congressional intent in delegating exclusive authority to FDA to approve and license
vaccines).
243. See Hury I, 863 F.2d at 1179 (noting that FDA only considers vaccine designs "if and
when" manufacturers come forward with proposal).
244. See id. (concluding that absence of FDA-approved alternatives to whole-cell accine does
not indicate FDA disapproval of any such alternatives). There are other reasons for allor, ing
state law to coexist with FDA regulations. Over the past decade, the FDA was forced to limit its
budget and cut back on its staff. SeeAusness, supra note 164, at 276 (stating that FDA has cut
staff by 2000 since 1980 (citingBruceA. Silverglade, Preaeption-The Consu rir i nt, 45 FOOD
DRUG COSM. U. 143, 144 (1990))). With reduced financial and staff capacities, the FDA has
a diminished ability to independently assess vaccine warnings. See id; sw aLsoJones ex trLJones
v. Lederle Lab., 695 F. Supp. 700, 711 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that limited FDA resources
would restrict agency's ability to perform independently).
1886 THE AMERICAN UN1VERSlIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1853
D. The Vaccine Act's Presumption of Warning Adequacy as an Attempt to
Resolve the Physical Conflict Dilemma
The Vaccine Act's presumption of adequate warning when
manufacturers conply with FDA standards may represent an attempt
to balance the Fifth Circuit's conflicting views toward physical conflict
preemption in Hurley If.24 In the interest of insulating manufactur-
ers from having to choose between federal criminal liability or state
tort liability, the Vaccine Act begins with the assumption that the
FDA-approved warning is adequate. 46 The Vaccine Act, however,
takes into account the passive nature of the FDA's warning-evaluation
process and compensates for this deficiency by allowing plaintiffs to
rebut the presumption 47 with a showing that the manufacturer
"engaged in fraud or intentional withholding of information." 48  If
the manufacturer has not provided the FDA with all relevant
information for examining the manufacturer's proposed warning, the
Act does not insulate the manufacturer against state inadequate
warning claims. 49
V. VACCINE ACT AND RSTATEMENT 402A COMMENT X
Section 300aa-22(b) (1) of the Vaccine Act adopts Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 402A comment k. Comment k represents an
245. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6345
(outlining inadequacy of civil tort system as compensation mechanism and instability of vaccine
market as reasons propelling vaccine legislation).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(2) (1988). The presumption reflects a legislative discomfort
with the litany of cases viewing FDA regulations as floors rather than ceilings. For cases finding
that FDA regulations are minimum standards, see supra note 229.
247. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-22(b) (2), -23(d) (2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Pursuant to §§ 300aa-
22(b)(2)(A) and -23(d)(2), a plaintiff may vitiate the presumption by showing that the
manufacturer engaged in fraud or intentional and wrongful withholding of information from
the Secretary of Health either before orafterapproval of the vaccine, or other criminal or illegal
activity relating to the safety and effectiveness of vaccines. Id. § 800aa-23(d) (2) (A).
Alternatively, the plaintiff may show by "clear and convincing evidence that the manufacturer
failed to exercise due care notwithstanding its compliance with ... [the] Act." IL § 800aa-
22(b) (2) (B).
This congressional approach closely parallels the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Hurky I.
According to the Fifth Circuit, a finding of physical conflict is warranted where state law imposes
standards violative of federal law andwhere the manufacturer has provided the FDA with all the
information necessary to evaluate the proposed warning. Hurleyv. Lederle Lab., 863 F.2d 1173,
1179 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing KVIJE, Inc. v. Austin Broadcasting Corp., 709 F,2d 922, 931-32 (5th
Cir. 1983)). The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the only question presentable to the jury was
whether Lederle provided the FDA with all available information. Id. at 1179-80. In effect, the
Vaccine Act arrives at the same result by allowing rebuttal of the warning presumption only If
the manufacturer withheld material information.
248. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-22(b)(2)(A),-23(d)(2)(A)-(C) (1988).
249. 1& § 800aa-23(d) (2) (B); see also supra note 246 (discussing ways plaintiff may overcome
presumption that manufacturer warnings in compliance with FDA standards are adequate).
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important exception to the strict liability doctrine.' This excep-
tion recognizes that there exists a certain class of products that is
incapable of being made safer,"1 but nonetheless provides great
value to society." Acknowledging the utilitarian interest in the
availability of such "unavoidably unsafe" products, comment k directs
that, so long as the "unavoidably unsafe" product is properly prepared
and marketed, strict liability will not apply. '  Because proper
manufacturing and proper warnings are prerequisites to immunity,
comment k only provides manufacturers with protection from liability
premised on strict liability design defect claims.'
A. The Vaccine Act's Blanket Application of Comment k to All Vccines
Covered by the Act
The Vaccine Act's legislative history clarifies Congress' intention to
apply comment k immunity to all vaccines covered by the Act'E In
deciding to apply comment k to vaccines, Congress expressed fear
that sympathetic juries would ignore the social utility of vaccines and
routinely rule for innocent victims and against "equally 'innocent'"
manufacturers.25  Congress, seeking to ensure the continued
compensation of victims while removing economic disincentives for
manufacturers, applied comment k to all vaccines covered by the Act
and created a no-fault compensation system for injured parties
250. SeeDark, supra note 69, at 820-21 (explaining that where product is unavoidably unsafe,
strict liability does not apply if product contains proper waming); Tm Moore, Co==-znt K
Immunity to Strid Liability: Should All Prescription Drugs Be Proteted?, 26 Hous. L REv. 707, 703
(1989) (arguing that unavoidably unsafe products, properly manufactured and containing
proper warnings, are not subject to strict liability).
251. See RESrATEhENT (SECoND) oF TORTS, supra note 17, § 402A cmt. k ("There are some
products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made
safe for their intended and ordinary use.").
252. S&eRESTATEIMNT (SECOND) OFTORTS, supra note 17, § 402Acm k (calling marketing
and use of unavoidably unsafe products such as Pasteur vaccine "fullyjustified, notwithstanding
the high degree of risk which they involve").
253. RESTATFMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 17, § 402A ant. I.
254. Se e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1931)
(reading comment k to hold that absence of appropriate warning constitutes unreasonable
danger, thus allowing strict liability claim); Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 465 (Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that comment k immunity concerns only design defects); Toner v. Lederle
Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 305 (Idaho 1987) (holding that express language of comment k only
immunizes manufacturers from strict liability for design defects and not for manufacturing or
warning defects); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1934) (holding that
comment k immunity does not insulate manufacturer from strict liability for failure to varn).
255. 1986 HOuSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6367 (The
committee has set forth comment kin this bill because it intends that the principle in comment
k regarding 'unavoidably unsafe products'. . . apply to the vaccines covered in the bill ... ).
256. 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6357
(discussing need to create alternative that compensates victim while not unduly penalizing
manufacturer).
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deprived of strict liability causes of action. M
The Vaccine Act's blanket adoption of comment k represents one
of three possible ways of approaching "unavoidably unsafe" prod-
ucts.m As an alternative to insulating all vaccines from strict design
defect liability, Congress could have eliminated comment k and
subjected all designs to strict design defect liability.259 Additionally,
as a middle ground between blanket insulation and no insulation,
Congress could have adopted a threshold test to determine whether
a given vaccine warrants special protection.2 ° This approach was
developed by the California Court of Appeals in Kearl v. Lederle
Laboratories.26  The court in Kearl did not contest the basic concept
of exceptional social utility underlying comment k.212 Instead, the
California Court of Appeals expressed concern with the manner of
the comment's application.21 Characterizing the judiciary's applica-
tion of comment k as "routine" and "mechanical,"2 " the court in
Kearl held that before ajury hears the issue of design defect liability,
ajudge must make a threshold determination of whether to grant a
defendant comment k immunity.21 In making this decision, the
judge should consider:
(1) whether, when distributed, the product was intended to confer
an exceptionally important benefit that made its availability highly
desirable; (2) whether the then-existing risk posed by the product
both was "substantial" and "unavoidable"; and (3) whether the
interest in availability (again measured as of the time of distribu-
tion) outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability
through strict liability design defect review.
265
A third approach to the "unavoidably unsafe" product issue is to
subject all products to strict design defect liability.26
257. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26, repinted in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. at 6367
(allowing victim to seek relief even where vaccine is as safe as possible).
258. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988) (explaining that courts
could apply strict liability doctrine to all products, apply comment k to all products, or apply
threshold test to determine when comment k protection should apply).
259. See id.
260. See i.
261. 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463-64 (CL App. 1985) (holding thatjudge must engage in three-
prong test to decide whether to apply comment k).
262. Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463 (Ct. App. 1985).
263. I. ("The statement that drugs are unavoidably [dangerous], and therefore within the
protection of comment k, has become almost tautological." (quoting Comment, Can a
Prescription Drug Be Defectivey Designed?-Brochu v. Ortho Phannaceutical Cosp., 31 DEPAUL L. REV.
247, 254 (1981))).
264. Id.
265. See id. at 463-64.
266. Id at 464.
267. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988).
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B. A 0iticism of the Vaccine Ad's Blanket Application of Comment k
Given the multitude of divergent judicial interpretations of
comment k, Congress had no paradigmatic example to follow when
drafting the Vaccine Act." Textual and structural arguments exist
both supporting and rebutting a blanket application of comment k to
all vaccines. A close reading of the text of comment k and analysis of
the comment's underlying policy, however, indicates that the concept
of "unavoidably unsafe" products, defined by the Restatement as
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use,
26
cannot support a blanket approach.27 0
1. Textual challenge
A literal reading of the text of comment k suggests that the
"unavoidably unsafe" standard requires some sort of discerning
test 2 1  The comment begins with the words, "There are some
products .... ." The American Law Institute's use of "some"
indicates that not all products in a class automatically merit immunity
from strict liability design defect claims. -'
The comment continues, "[Iln the present state of human
knowledge, these products are quite incapable of being made safe for
their intended and ordinary use."274  Measuring from the time of
distribution, a plain-language interpretation of these two dauses
suggests that only a product that is not subject to improvement using
268. See Davis & Bowman, supra note 75, at 289 (explaining that differentjurisdictions have
employed divergent interpretations of comment k); Moore, supra note 250, at 724-25 (dtingfour
separate approaches to comment k treatment). CompareToner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297,
308 (Idaho 1987) (holding that comment k immunity does not apply to all prescription drugs),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988) with Brown, 751 P.2d at 482 n.11 (finding that immunity from
strict design defect liability applies to all prescription drugs) and Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813
P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1991) (holding that all drugs approved by FDA are "unavoidably unsafe" as
matter of law).
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 17, § 402A ant. I
270. See Toner, 732 P.2d at 308 ("It is equally obvious that not all drugs are so perfectly
designed that they cannot be made more pure or more safe, or that there are not safcr, suitable
alternatives."). An interesting counterargument, however, is that any improvement of a drug
changes its chemical nature, thus creating an entirely new drug. According to this argument.
the act of improving old drugs results in the creation of a new drug. Because the end result of
improvement is a new drug, a manufacturer, by definition, cannot produce a safer version of
the same drug. SeeBro=a, 751 P.2d at 478 (rejecting argument that improving drug's design will
create new drug that cannot be considered definitionally as improved design of old drug).
271. See Toner, 732 P.2d at 308 (arguing that comment contemplates risk-benefit analysis);
Moore, supra note 250, at 722 (stating that language of comment k does not indicate any intent
to provide blanket protection to all drugs).
272. RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 17, § 402A ant. i.
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 17, § 402A cmt k.
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 17, § 402A ant. k.
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currently held scientific knowledge warrants comment k immuni-
ty.275
In order for the Vaccine Act to comport with the language of
comment k, Congress would have to perform either a risk-utility
analysis before promulgating section 22(b) or allow the judiciary to
perform a risk-utility analysis at trial.278 Given that Congress reject-
ed the latter approach,277 we must presume that Congress applied
a risk-utility analysis to the vaccines covered by the Act. The language
of comment k, however, raises questions as to whether the whole-cell
DTP vaccine warrants classification as an "unavoidably unsafe"
product.
278
In order to reach the conclusion that the whole-cell DTP vaccine
is not an "unavoidably unsafe" product, it is first necessary to provide
some history concerning vaccine designs. The DTP vaccine currently
licensed by the FDA consists of three parts-diphtheria toxoids,
tetanus toxoids, and the whole cell pertussis component.279 Adverse
reactions to the DTP vaccine have been linked to the pertussis
portion of the vaccine.2 °  While the immunizing factors in the
diphtheria and tetanus portion of the vaccine can be identified and
purified, the offending elements of the pertussis portion cannot be
removed.28'
Many experts in the medical community, concerned with the
reactivity of the pertussis portion of the DTP vaccine, have advocated
275. See Toner, 732 P.2d at 306 (stating that "unavoidable risk" requires no feasible alternative
design that, at time of product's production, accomplishes same purpose with less risk). On the
other hand, textual arguments certainly exist supporting Congress' blanket application of
comment k immunity to all vaccines covered by the Vaccine Act. Comment k cites the Pasteur
vaccine as an "outstanding example" of an "unavoidably unsafe" product. Id. Louis Pasteur, a
19th century French chemist, developed a rabies vaccine and made substantial contribution5 to
the field of immunology. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICnONARY, supra note 200, at 1239,
Additionally, comment k speaks of "many ... vaccines" worthy of comment k treatment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 17, § 402A cmt. k.
276. The language of comment k would permit Congress to provide blanket comment k
immunity, if, prior to promulgating the Vaccine Act, Congress performed an "alternative design"
analysis for all of the vaccines covered. It is textually unacceptable, however, for Congress to
legislate blanket immunity from strict liability under the guise of applying comment k. If
Congress decides to insulate manufacturers from strict design defect liability, Congress should
announce that it is abandoning comment k and is creating a new standard.
277. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26, reprinted in 1986 U.S.S.CA.N. at 6367
(explaining that comment k applies to all vaccines covered by Act).
278. See infra notes 282-99 and accompanying text (stating that existence of equally effective,
safer version of DTP supports view that whole-cell DTP is not "unavoidably unsafe").
279. Naile, supra note 36, at 661.
280. Naile, supra note 36, at 662.
281. Naile, supra note 36, at 662; Toner v. Lederle Lab., 782 P.2d 297, 300 (Idaho 1987)
(stating that complex nature of pertussis-causing organism is so complex that toxin cannot be
deactivated) (citing Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 731 (2d Cir. 1979)), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 942 (1988).
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the development of an alternative vaccine.' Currently, two alterna-
ives to the whole-cell pertussis portion exist: acellular and non-
cellular vaccines.2" Although not currently manufactured, a
non-cellular vaccine was discovered in the 1950s.281 Testing of the
non-cellular vaccine has revealed a product with adequate
inmunnogenicity but lower reactivity than its whole cell pertussis
counterparL
28
In 1961, Eli Lilly & Company applied for a patent for a non-cellular
pertussis vaccine named Tri-Solgen. Upon FDA approval,
Tri-Solgen dominated the market until the mid-1960s. -  Of special
importance to the comment k issue is an internal clinical evaluation
run by Lederle Laboratories and Eli Lilly in 1967.Y The test
compared the relative reactivity of Lederle's Tri-Immunol vaccine, a
whole-cell DTP vaccine, against Lilly's Tri-Solgen non-cellular
vaccine." 9 The results of a test on 335 infants showed that the
whole-cell vaccine had a much higher reactivity rate than did the
non-cellular vaccine.' Although Lederle had first-hand evidence
demonstrating the lower reactivity rate of the non-cellular pertussis
vaccine, it continued to market the whole-cell version." !
In 1975, Lilly stopped producing Tri-Solgen.1 Wyeth Laborato-
ries secured an option to the rights for the manufacturing technology
of Tri-Solgen. Wyeth could not, however, purchase Lilly's license,
because FDA regulations require manufacturers of identical vaccines
to acquire separate licenses m3 During the late-1970s, Wyeth devel-
282. See Burke, supra note 126, at 547.
283. Naile, supranote 36, at 668-69 (discussing acellular vaccine, used for mass immunization
in Japan since 1991, and non-cellular vaccines as alternatives to whole-cell vaccine).
284. Toner, 732 P.2d at300 (noting that dinical testing of non-cellular vaccine occurred in
early 1950s); Burke, supa note 126, at 568-70 (stating that Eli-Lilly developed non-ccular DTP
vaccine in 1950s).
285. Burke, supra note 126, at 569-70; se TABEa'S C'tLOPEDIC M.DIcAL Dic"OwrAiy, supra
note 200, at 896 (defining immunogenicity as "[tihe capacity to stimulate the formation of
antibodies").
286. Burke, supra note 126, at 569.
287. See Burke, supra note 126, at 569 (citing public relations campaign documenting
Tri-Solgen's reduced reactivity rate as reason for non-cellular vaccine's success).
288. See Burke, supra note 126, at 569 (discussing internal clinical evaluation comparing
reaction rates between Tri-Solgen and whole-cell vccine). The interoffice memo, released in
1985 by an organization named Dissatisfied Parents Together, was produced in response to a
discovery request during DTP litigation. Id. at 569 n.163.
289. Burke, supra note 126, at 569 (stating that Lederle initiated test to evaluate the
purported success of Lilly's vaccine).
290. Burke, supra note 126, at 259; se also Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 300 (Idaho
1987), erL. den/ae, 485 U.S. 942 (1988).
291. Burke, supra note 126, at 569.
292. See Toner, 732 P.2d at 300; Burke, supm note 126, at 570.
293. See Nale, supra note 36, at 668 (explaining that Wyeth could not meet FDA facility-
licensing requirements).
1892 THE AMERICAN UNIVERsITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1853
oped its own non-cellular vaccine.2' The FDA, however, refused to
license Wyeth's product, citing both a lack of evidence showing that
the non-cellular vaccine was superior to the whole-cell version and
concerns about possible toxicity.29 Since Lilly's withdrawal from the
DTP market, only the whole-cell DTP vaccine has been available in
the United States.2 96
Application of the language of comment k to the above-mentioned
DTP history reveals that DTP may not qualify as an "unavoidably
unsafe" product.2' The scientific history suggests that manufactur-
ers have possessed the knowledge and the production capabilities to
produce a safer version of the DTP vaccine.2 98  At the same time,
however, the FDA does not currently permit the sale of the
non-cellular DTP vaccine.2" This analysis demonstrates that a
textual interpretation of comment k does not, standing alone, resolve
the safety versus availability dilemma in the context of design defect
liability. Rather, one must examine the policy considerations
underlying the strict liability doctrine and the exception to these
considerations contained in comment k.
2. Policy challenge
Although the Vaccine Act's adoption of a blanket approach to
comment k partially conflicts with a textual interpretation of the
comment, Congress' decision nonetheless finds support in the case
law of many jurisdictions.30°  Decisions announcing a blanket
294. Naile, supra note 36, at 668.
295. Naile, supra note 36, at 668.
296. Burke, supra note 126, at 570.
297. See Burke, supra note 126, at 575 (explaining that strongest argument against awarding
whole-cell vaccine "unavoidably unsafe" product status is existence of equally effective and less
dangerous alternative product); see also Toner, 732 P.2d at 306 (stating that existence of
alternative design, posing less risk, would undermine purpose of comment k and would not
receive immunity from liability). In Toner, the Idaho Supreme Court, in response to questions
certified by the Ninth Circuit, did not find it necessary to determine whether the whole-cell DTP
vaccine is an unavoidably unsafe product because the question as to the effects of comment k
on strict liability was discussed simply to help answer the certified question of comment k's
application to negligence claims. Id. at 303-04. Nevertheless, the Idaho Supreme Court did
offer some hints as to what its answers would be. The court in Toner said that "not all drugs -ire
so perfectly designed that they cannot be made more pure or more safe, or that there are not
safer, suitable alternatives." Id. at 308. Given the conceptual framework offered by the court,
the ability of DTP manufacturers to produce a non-cellular vaccine could preclude granting the
whole-cell vaccine comment k status.
298. See supra notes 282-95 and accompanying text (discussing manufacturer knowledge ok'
potentially safer, alternative DTP vaccine).
299. See Naile, supra note 36, at 668 (stating that FDA refused to license Wyeth Laboratories
to produce Tri-Solgen or its own non-cellular vaccine).
300. See Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (D. Md. 1975) (stating that
comment k applies to all prescription drugs); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal.
1988) (holding that comment k applied to all prescription drugs); Johnson v. American
LESSONS FROM THE VACCINE ACT
approach recognize the analytical dilemmas created by rejecting a
balancing test.o l  For example, in Brwn v. Superior Court,' the
Supreme Court of California stated:
It seems unjust to grant the same protection from liability to those
who gave us thalidomide as to the producers of penicillin. If some
method could be devised to confine the benefit of the comment k
negligence standard to those drugs that have proved useful to
mankind while denying the privilege to those that are clearly
harmful, it would deserve serious consideration.P0
These courts nonetheless elevate the consumer interest in the
availability of drugs over the safety interest of holding manufacturers
strictly liable for their products so
The Vaccine Act's blanket application of comment k is premised on
concerns that strict product liability causes of action destabilized the
vaccine market.' 5 A 1986 Report, written by the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce, illustrates congressional concern with the
future of the country's universal immunization policy,"' In explain-
ing the need for legislation in this area, the House Report begins with
a compelling assessment of the successes of American vaccine policy:
Vaccination of children against deadly, disabling, but preventable
infectious diseases has been one of the most spectacularly effective
public health initiatives this country has ever undertaken. Use of
vaccines has prevented thousands of children's deaths each year
and has substantially reduced the effects resulting from disease.
Billions of medical and health-related dollars have been saved by
immunizations. 07
Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318,1323 (Kan. 1986) (holding that sabin polio vaccine is unavoidably
unsafe as matter of law).
301. See, eg., Brown, 751 P.2d at 479 (admitting that blanket approach may reduce potential
for development of safer drugs); Terrie Bialostok Brodie, Brown v. Superior Court: Drug
Manufacturers Get Immuniudfrom Strict Liabi lyforDignDefaect, 19 GOLDEN GATE U. L REv. 435,
441-42 (1989) (discussing Brown court's statement that Restatment lacks clarity as to proper
application of comment k).
302. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
303. Brown, 751 P.2d at 481.
304. Se4 eg., id at 479 (stating that both because drugs are very beneficial to society, and
because holding drug manufacturers to strict liability standard may reduce drug availability.
public policy favors negligence standard for drug manufacturers); Burke, supra note 126, at 559
(stating that application of negligence standard, rather than strict liability, for drugs is based on
belief that product availability of certain drugs is more important than manufacturer
accountability for drug defects).
305. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
306. 1986 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-7, rnrinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6344-48
(stating purpose and need of new systems for compensating individuals who have been injured
by vaccines routinely administered to children).
307. 1986 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4, reprintd in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6345.
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The Report then discusses the small number of vaccinees who
suffer permanent and sometimes deadly vaccine-related injuries.803
The Report goes on to document the recent withdrawal of manufac-
turers from the vaccine market and the concomitant increase in
vaccine prices. 9 After considering the benefits of universal vaccina-
tion and the recent instability of the market, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce concluded that Congress must ensure the
continued availability of children's vaccines.
310
The legislative history demonstrates the utilitarian, policy-based
reasoning underlying the Vaccine Act's adoption of comment k. This
reasoning closely parallels the California Supreme Court's
product-availability-over-product-safety approach in Brown v. Superior
Court. The court in Brown candidly admitted that it was rejecting the
increased safety benefits promoted by strict design defect liability in
order to promote the rapid availability of highly beneficial drugs.
31
'
In reaching its decision to grant all prescription drugs comment k
immunity, the California Supreme Court cited three policy consider-
ations. First, society has a greater interest in the immediate availabili-
ty of beneficial drugs than in the increased safety of these drugs."'
Second, manufacturers, unsure of the future status of their products
under a risk-benefit comment k analysis, will be deterred from
developing new drugs. 313 Third, manufacturers carrying greater
product liability insurance to cover design defect liability will raise the
308. 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4, eprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. at 6347 ("While
most of the Nation's children enjoy great benefit from immunization programs, a small but
significant number have been gravely injured.").
309. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4,6-7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6345,
6347-48 (describing how increased number of lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers and
decreased availability of affordable product liability insurance has resulted in higher vaccine
prices and manufacturer's withdrawal from vaccine market).
310. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348
("Thus, the withdrawal of even a single vaccine manufacturer would represent the very real
possibility of vaccine shortages, and, in turn, increasing numbers ofunimmunized children, and,
perhaps, a resurgence of preventable diseases.").
311. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988) ("Public policy favors the
development and marketing of beneficial new drugs, even though some risks, perhaps serious
ones, might accompany their introduction, because drugs can save lives and reduce pain and
suffering.").
312. i&
313. I& According to this argument, the looming prospect of large damage awards will deter
manufacturers from investing in socially valuable research and development. e Moore, supra
note 250, at 718-19 (stating that manufacturers considering developing new drugs %ill be
deterred because there is no assurance that state court will find drug "unavoidably unsafe" under
risk-benefit analysis).
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price of vaccines and make vaccines unavailable to the average
consumer.
3 14
As was the case with the textual interpretation of comment k, the
court in Brown relied on policy considerations that do notjustify the
Vaccine Act's application of blanket immunity for all vaccines I5
Brown recognizes that there are certain socially valuable drugs that
cannot be improved using current scientific knowledge? 6 Given
the health benefits rendered by such drugs, Brown reads comment k
asjustifying the immediate marketing of the drugs, regardless of the
fact that future scientific advances may allow safety improvements.31 7
The court believed that the public could be harmed if manufacturers
delayed distributing prescription drugs, whose safety could not be
improved under current scientific knowledge, in order to avoid design
defect liability318 As the previous discussion of the history of DTP
testing indicates, however, manufacturers may currently possess the
knowledge to produce a safer vaccine.319  That knowledge may
presently allow manufacturers to make safety alterations without
significantly inhibiting the distribution of their productl3
Furthermore, both Brown and the Vaccine Act accept the
ill-conceived policy notion that strict design defect liability deters
investment in research and development 32  Holding vaccine
manufacturers strictly liable for design defects promotes, rather than
deters, research and development." Under a risk-utility approach
to comment k, manufacturers who do not act on current scientific
knowledge to produce safer vaccines would be held strictly liable for
design defects.3" Given that manufacturers are held to the knowl-
314. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 479 (arguing that insurance will increase price and lower
availability of pharmaceuticals).
315. See Brodie, supra note 301, at 454-55 (arguing that Brown court's belief is vithout merit
because design defect liability neither deters research and development nor destabilizes isccine
market); Moore, supra note 250, at 732 (arguing that design defect liability actually encourages
research and development).
316. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 479 (stating that it is not beneficial to withhold some drugs until
scientific knowledge advances enough to determine all of drug's effects).
317. See id. (stating that interest in availability of socially useful drugs outweighs benefit of
postponing distribution until new scientific knowledge evolves).
318. Id
319. See supra notes 286-92 and accompanying text (discussing Lederle and Eli lilly tests of
Tri-Immunol and Tri-Solgen in 1960s).
320. See Moore, supra note 250, at 732-33 (arguing that design defect liability encourages
research, but does not inhibit product availability).
321. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 479; 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, rprinted in 1936
U.S.C.CAN. at 6348 (suggesting that Vaccine Act will lead to more stable vaccine market
because manufacturers will have better understanding of potential exposure to litigation).
322. See Moore, supra note 250, at 732 (stating that design defect liability fuels research).
323. See4 eg., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1931)
(holding that existence of equally effective but safer version of product warranted finding of
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edge of experts in their fields, 2 4 most manufacturers will invest
considerable time and resources into research and development in
order to avoid design defect liability3
5
Rather than promoting research and development, the Vaccine
Act's blanket application of comment k removes incentives for vaccine
manufacturers to improve their products.32 6 By insulating vaccine
manufacturers from strict design defect liability, the Vaccine Act
implicitly announces that the Federal Government is satisfied with the
current state of vaccine safety, and that the Government will not use
the tort system to encourage manufacturers to improve their
321vaccines.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Direct Warnings
Evaluating the Vaccine Act's treatment of consumer warnings is a
difficult task. On the one hand, the legislation banning direct failure
to warn liability removes an important vehicle for promoting an
informed patient population. 28 On the other hand, by requiring
health care providers to distribute standard warnings written by the
Secretary, the Act attempts to achieve, by way of regulation, the same
result that Davis v. Wyeth 3" and its progeny achieved through the
civil tort system.3-3
While this Comment applauds the design of the Vaccine Act's
informational and recording requirements, it also recognizes that state
law direct warning causes of action and federal reporting require-
design defect); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 306 (Idaho 1987) (holding that drug must
be as safe as possible in order to trigger comment k immunity), cart. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988).
324. SeeJohn P. Reilly, TheErosion of Comment K 14 U. DAYFON L. REV, 255, 260 (1989).
325. See Moore, supra note 250, at 732.
326. SeeFinn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1165 (Cal. 1984) (Bird, CJ., dissenting)
(arguing that design defect liability encourages manufacturers to correct safety flaws);
ChristopherJ. Albee & Dawn Kilgallen, Comment, Providing Blanket Comment K Immuniy to All
IDA Approved Ethical Drugs: The Dfect in Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEcAL
COMMENT. 475, 493-94 (1991) (arguing that blanket application benefits manufacturers at
expense of public safety).
327. Comment k speaks of justified marketing. Blanket application of comment k to all
vaccines implies that Congress considers the interest in vaccine availability strong enough to
deflate safety concerns. But see 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-27(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp.V 1993) (stating that
Secretary of Health and Human Services shall promote development of safer vaccines and create
task force).
328. See Styles, supra note 70, at 113 (stating that adequate patient information satifies
informed consent doctrine).
329. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
330. See supra notes 91-109 and accompanying text (discussing holding in Davis),
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ments are not mutually exclusive."31 If the ultimate goal of a
universal vaccination policy is safety, federal legislation could maintain
both a state common law-based direct duty to vrarn as well as federal
reporting regulations. The combination of a state duty to warn and
federal reporting requirements would combat lax community practices
and the excessively pro-vaccine environment in two distinct ways. The
federal regulations would compensate for inconsistent community
practices by requiring physicians to distribute standardized vaccilie
information and to report contraindications.3 2 At the same time,
a common law direct warning rule would diminish the current
universal vaccination policy's weakening of physician warnings by
ensuring that individual vaccinees possess adequate information both
to make an informed decision prior to vaccination and to protect
against adverse reactions subsequent to vaccination. -
The Vaccine Act, however, clearly acknowledges its compromising
purpose 3  The Act seeks both to reduce manufacturer liability and
to create a more pro-plaintiff compensation system."' Given its
goal of insulating manufacturers from excessive liability, the Vaccine
Act skillfully removes direct failure to warn liability while continuing
to encourage an informed patient base through its vaccine informa-
tion and reporting requirements.'
331. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2628-29 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that FDAregulations and state tort law can operate concurrently); Ausness,
supra note 164, at 278 (arguing that federal regulation and state law can concurrently promote
drug safety).
332. Sme 42 U.S.C. § S00aa-25(b)(1)(A)-(C) (1988) (setting forth vaccine reporting
procedures for health care providers and vaccine manufacturers). The regulations can reduce
the lack of physician-patient communication that results from the customary practice standard
of informed consent. Furthermore, by providing physicians with several scenarios in which they
must report to the Secretary, the regulations require doctors to consider seriously the risks of
vaccination.
333. SeeIncollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206,222 (Pa. 1971) (arguing that manufacturer could
be negligent for medical community's disregard of warnings). By charging manufacturers with
knowledge of the medical community's ability to comprehend and implement manufacturer
warnings, state tort law, in addition to federal regulations, ensures that physicians will become
aware of the risks of vaccination. See Burke, supm note 126, at 592 (endorsing state law
requirement that manufacturers use "Dear Doctor" letters and other advertising methods to
present objective view of product and combat pro-vaccine environment).
334. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, rrpnintai in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6348
(stating that rationales behind Vaccine Act were dissatisfaction with cil tort system as
compensation mechanism and instability of vaccine market).
335. Sfe 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, repinkd in 1986 U.S.CC.A.N. at 6348.
336. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note l,at29-30, rprintedin 1986U.S.C.CAN.at6370.71.
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B. Relationship Between Federal and State Law
Prior to the passage of the Vaccine Act, manufacturers were often
caught between inconsistent state and federal warning standards.
37
Given that manufacturers may not alter the content of their warnings
without FDA approval,3" compliance with state law warning stan-
dards sometimes required manufacturers to violate federal law or
regulations. Conversely, compliance with federal regulatory warning
standards often exposed manufacturers to liability under state law.13
The Vaccine Act responded to this dilemma by creating a presump-
tion that warnings complying with FDA standards are adequate. 
40
This Comment credits the Vaccine Act for taking an affirmative step
toward resolving the vaccine warning dilemma. The Vaccine Act's
presumption initially tips the scales towards manufacturers while also
giving plaintiffs a vehicle for overcoming the presumption. The Act,
however, has imprudently moved from one extreme to the other.
The legislation removes too much of the impetus for manufacturers
to act on their actual or constructive knowledge concerning the
adequacy of warnings. The presumption of warning adequacy allows
manufacturers to disregard knowledge of actual deficiencies in their
warnings so long as the warning complies with FDA standards&il
In lieu of the Vaccine Act's presumption of adequate warnings, this
Comment proposes the following framework. If under state law a
judge or jury finds that a manufacturer knew or should have known
of an inadequacy in warning,l the court should determine whether
337. See Naile, supra note 36, at 695 (stating that manufacturers cannot meet state common
law standards until FDA authorizes change in warning or design).
338. See supra notes 203-10 and accompanying text (discussing role of FDA in approval of
warning labels).
339. See Naile, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
340. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b) (2) (1988).
341. FDA labelling requirements for vaccine potency illustrate the potential dangers of
presuming the adequacy of a warning when it meets FDA standards. See 21 C.F.RL § 620.6(d)
(1994) (requiring that labels on DTP bottles state that vaccine has potency of 12 mouse
protective units per dose); Burke, supra note 126, at 577-78 (stating that not all bottles contain
12 mouse protective units per dose as suggested on FDA mandated labels). But see 21 C.F.R, §
620.4(g) (stating that despite label information, FDAwill approve vaccine lot containing between
8 and 36 mouse protective units per dose). A "lot" is "that quantity of uniform material
identified by the manufacturer as having been thoroughly mixed in a single vessel." Id.
§ 600.3(y).
The FDA informs manufacturers of the actual mouse protection unit level upon approval of
the vaccine. See Burke, supra note 126, at 577. If compliance with FDA warning standards is
presumptively adequate, the Vaccine Act allows manufhcturers to knowingly run the risk of a
child receiving a triple dose of the vaccine. Id. at 578.
342. The proposal imputes to manufacturers the same standard applied in other warning
cases. SeeW. PAGE KEETON Er AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 697 (5th
ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (explaining that standard used in warning cases is that manufacturer
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the manufacturer petitioned the FDA for a change in the warning
language in order to resolve the inadequacy.' Manufacturers who
fail to act on their knowledge or constructive knowledge of an
inadequate warning should be held liable?" If the manufacturer
has petitioned the FDA for a change in warning language and the
FDA had rejected the petition, however, the manufacturer should not
be found liable.'
This proposed framework seeks to force manufacturers to exercise
all safety options within their capacity. The law should not allow
manufacturers who do not address known or knowable warning
inadequacies to seek shelter under a deferential presumption. FDA
standards are designed to ensure safety, not to insulate manufacturers
from confronting difficult safety issues. If Congress amends the
Vaccine Act to reflect this framework, the deterrence function of
warning liability would remain intact. At the same time, the amend-
ment would recognize that deterrence has limits, and that state
deterrence theories should not force manufacturers to choose
between violating federal or state law.
C. Commet k
Congress' decision to grant blanket comment k immunity to all
vaccines covered by the Vaccine Act conflicts with both the text and
policy of comment k.' The fact that vaccines as a class have
effectively reduced the risk of many formerly deadly diseases does not
warrant a per se application of comment k immunity to all vac-
must know or have reason to know of danger of product for liability to attach); Naile, supra note
36, at 679 (same).
343. Manufacturers are not completely prohibited from changing warnings after initial FDA
approval. See Clarke, supra note 158, at 529 (stating that FDA allows manufacturers to propose
new language by filing supplemental new drug application).
344. This Comment's endorsement of holding manufacturers liable, when they do not
petition the FDA when they have knowledge of warning inadequacy, is premised on the theory
that tort law encourages product safety. SeAusness, supra note 164, at 277.
This theory does not raise the problem, addressed in Htuej v. Lzderle Lab., of placing
manufacturers in an inescapable bind between federal and state mandates. Hurley v. Lederle
Lab., 651 F. Supp. 993,999 (E.D. Tex. 1986), reu'4 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988). Manufactur-
ers may attempt to meet state common law requirements through the FDA mechanism of new
supplemental applications.
345. Once the FDA has rejected a manufacturer's request to improve a varning, the physical
conflict preemption dilemma, where the manufacturer cannot concurrently satis* both federal
and state laws, arises. Saesupra notes 239-49 and accompanying text. At this point, the function
of tort'law as a safety promoter ceases, and there is little reason to hold manufacturers to a
standard not attainable without violating federal law.
346. See supra notes 255-67 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' decision to apply
blanket comment k immunity to vaccines covered by Vaccine Act).
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cines. 7 According to the language of comment k, a vaccine only
merits special protection when the danger posed by the vaccine is
unavoidable and when the utility of the vaccine outweighs the
risks.' As previously discussed, the Vaccine Act's blanket applica-
tion of comment k is most suspect with regard to the DPT vaccine
because numerous studies have indicated that manufacturers are
currently capable of producing a safer vaccine." 9 This Comment
does not question the utility of the DTP vaccine; it questions the
wisdom of permanently justifying the dangers of the whole-cell DTP
vaccine by applying to the vaccine the label "unavoidably unsafe." As
discussed earlier, evidence exists indicating that DTP manufacturers
may currently possess the ability to produce a safer vaccine."50 At
the present time, however, the FDA only permits the sale of the
whole-cell vaccine. 51 The question must therefore be asked, what
degree of design defect liability will best promote manufacturer
investment of time and resources into the development of a new DTP
vaccine that reduces adverse reactions?
This Comment recommends that Congress repeal the Vaccine Act's
blanket application of comment k immunity. In place of a blanket
application approach, Congress should adopt the three-part balancing
test developed by the California Court of Appeals in Kearl 52 The
Kearl test provides a dual advantage. The three-part threshold test
avoids the establishment of a federally endorsed status quo in which
vaccine research and development has reached an acceptable
endpoint. Under Kear manufacturers will recognize the possibility
that the FDA will approve an alternative DTP vaccine. 53 In order
to avoid potential design defect liability, manufacturers will invest in
347. See George H. King, Note, A Presciptionfor App(ying Strict Liability: Not AU Dragn Deserve
Comment K Immunization, 21 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 809, 824-25 (1989) (arguing that only unavoidably
unsafe drugs providing exceptional benefits warrant comment k protection).
348. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs, supra note 17, § 402A cmt. k.
349. See supra notes 285-99 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 286-96 and accompanying text.
351. See Burke, supra note 126, at 570 (stating that since production of Tri-Solgen stopped
in 1970s, only whole-cell DTP vaccines have been available).
352. Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463-64 (Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting blanket
approach to application of comment k immunity). Keari establishes a three-part test for
determiningwhethera product is "unavoidably dangerous." The Kearltest requires determining:
(1) whether the product was intended to confer a high benefit; (2) whether the then-existing
risk of the product was "substantial" and "unavoidable"; and (3) whether the interest In
availability at the time of distribution outweighs the interest in enhanced accountability. Id. at
464.
353. SeeKing, supra note 347, at 826 (stating that upon discovery of existence of safer drug,
manufacturers would discontinue marketing less safe drug); Moore, supra note 250, at 732
(suggesting that imposition of strict design defect liability will encourage research and
development).
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research efforts to improve the whole-cell DTP vaccine and will
petition the FDA for approval of their new designs.'
The Keari test, while promoting manufacturer investment in
improved safety, also accommodates the underlying theme of Brown
v. Superior Court, namely that some drugs possess exceptional social
utility and therefore warrant more lenient liability standardsYs Two
of the three-prongs of the Kearltest consider society's immediate need
for beneficial drugs. The first prong considers the nature of the
benefits of the drug in question, and the third prong considers the
public's interest in the drug's availabilityss6  The Keari test, there-
fore, effectively provides DTP manufacturers with temporary immunity
from strict design defect liabilityss while continuing to encourage
manufacturers to search for a safer product.
This lack of permanent protection from strict design defect liability
led the Supreme Court of California to overrule Keari in Brown:
[Under the Keari test, a] manufacturer's incentive to develop what
it might consider a superior product would be diminished if it
might be held strictly liable for harmful side effects because a trial
court could decide, perhaps many years later, that in fact another
product which was available on the market would have accom-
plished the same result' s
The impact of the court's criticism is not applicable because the FDA
only allows manufacturers to market the whole-cell DTP vaccine. The
possibility that the FDA may approve a new DTP vaccine will
encourage, rather than discourage, individual manufacturers to
improve their own products.s 9 The court in Brown envisioned
manufacturers halting all research efforts for fear that their future
product would one day be found to be defective in design3sW The
codification of the Kearl test would not lead to this result. Under
Kear the complacent DTP manufacturer, who continues to market an
unsafe vaccine, will face liability for a defect in design. 6
354. See Moore, supra note 250, at 732 (arguing that threat of financial liability will promote
increased safety efforts by manufacturers).
355. See Kear 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464 (incorporating weighing benefits of drug and public's
interest in availability of drug into threshold test).
356. a
357. See Moore, supra note 250, at 729 (stating that beneficial drugs %iUl continue to receive
comment k protection under Kead-like balancing test). Because the FDA currently approves
only the whole-cell DTP vaccine, the DTP vaccine will qualify for "unavoidably unsafe" status.
358. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482 (Cal. 1988).
359. See supra note 315 (discussing argument that strict design defect liability promotes
manufacturer investment in research and development).
360. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 482.
361. See Ka4d 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464 (instructing that trial judge, when considering
unavoidability of danger in product, should take into account"availability... ofanyalternative
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No given formula for balancing society's need for vaccine availabili-
ty with society's need for vaccine safety will satisfy all the parties
involved. At present, the Kearl threshold test offers a viable compro-
mise that both respects the social utility of the DTP vaccine and
encourages the development of an even safer product. For these
reasons, Congress should repeal the blanket application of comment
k to all vaccines and instead codify the Kearl three-prong test.
CONCLUSION
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986
represents a much needed legislative response to the civil tort system's
inability to achieve a proper balance between vaccine safety and
vaccine availability. To a large degree, the Vaccine Act achieves its
goals. Plaintiffs may seek compensation in a no-fault compensation
system, and manufacturers are relieved of the burden and expense of
defending vaccine injury law suits. The Vaccine Act's modification of
state common law for plaintiffs who reject judgment under the
statutory no-fault compensation program, however, places too much
emphasis on vaccine availability and not enough emphasis on vaccine
safety. In order to strike a more equitable balance, this Comment
recommends that Congress take the following steps: (1) require
manufacturers with knowledge of warning inadequacies to petition the
FDA for a warning alteration before giving manufacturers the benefit
of the presumption that warnings in compliance with FDA standards
are adequate; and (2) adopt the three-factor Kearl test for determin-
ing "unavoidably unsafe" product status. Both recommendations
respect the social utility of vaccines and will therefore promote a
workable balancing of safety and availability interests.
If the majority of vaccine injury plaintiffs continue to accept
judgment under the statutory no-fault compensation program, these
changes will not have a large scale impact on vaccine injury litigation.
As Congress begins to consider legislation in other areas of product
liability law, however, it should take note of the shortcomings of the
Vaccine Act's alteration of state tort law. Congress should also ensure
that future statutory modifications of the civil tort system establish a
workable balance between product availability and product safety.
product that would have as effectively accomplished the full intended purpose of the subject
product"). Kearl announces to manufacturers that it is in their best interest to develop the
equally effective alternative product rather than be presented with evidence that they are
marketing an inferior and dangerous product. Id.
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